In this talk, we will present two projects that ask how we can enable individuals and groups to cooperate with future generations under different circumstances and challenges. In the first project, we look at ambiguity: from climate change to the biodiversity crisis, there exists considerable ambiguity in the degree of cooperation required and such ambiguity limits the extent to which people typically cooperate. We present the results of an intergenerational public goods game, which show that a democratic institution can promote cooperation, even in the face of ambiguity. We further study the role of beliefs and the mechanical (structural) effects of the voting institution on outcomes. In the second project, we consider overlapping generations in order to study altruism, reciprocity, social information, and self-interested equilibria as possible mechanisms to sustain intergenerational cooperation. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where a sequence of players choose how to allocate an endowment between themselves and future, prior, or contemporary players. By varying the option set and the information set, we can separate possible mechanisms for sustaining investment in the future. We find that the ability to give back increases the willingness to give forward, but a social preference for reciprocity rather than individual rationality drives the result. In sum, while our results demonstrate some difficult challenges to our ability to cooperate with future generations, they also offer some opportunities—and perhaps a glimmer of hope—for policymakers and society concerned with sustaining our resources for future generations.