

**Cosmophany :**  
**the living art of opening ambient worlds**

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**Abstract** – The word « art » is here understood in the double meaning of its Indo-European root AR-, i.e. an idea of joint and an idea of arrangement. How do living beings arrange the juncture between themselves and the environment ? The question will not be considered only in ecological (or biological) terms, but also in ontological and logical terms ; that is, onto/logically as well. It implies the subjecthood of the living, as advocated by Uexküll (1864-1944) and later by Imanishi (1902-1992), including the human, as advocated by Watsuji (1889-1960), in the epistemic frame of mesology (*Umweltlehre*, *fûdoron* 風土論 : the study of milieux, or ambient worlds), which implies not only an overcoming of modern dualism and mechanicism, but also a sublation (*Aufhebung*) of two incompatible logics : the Aristotelian logic of the identity of the subject, and the Nishidian logic of the identity of the predicate, as represented by the concept of *trajection* (*tsûtai* 通態). Accordingly, the work of art is seen as the trajection of the Earth into a certain world, i.e. a *cosmophany*.

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*Art und Weise* (de) :  
fashion, manner, mode, way (uk)  
仕方、やり方、流儀、風 (jp)

**Prolegomenon**

The word « art », in Indo-European languages like English, has a root *AR*, inferring the double meaning of *joint* and of *arrangement*. Then how do living beings arrange the juncture between themselves and the environment ?

**§ 1. From geography to Heidegger, or the reverse ?**

About a score of years ago, beginning to write *Écoumène. Introduction à l'étude des milieux humains* (*Ecumene. An introduction to the study of human milieux*)<sup>1</sup>, I started from the acknowledgment that « ontology lacks a geography, and geography lacks an ontology »<sup>2</sup>, and accordingly undertook the task of bringing that missing ontology to geography. I did that in the wake of mesology – the study of milieux, or ambient worlds – into which I had been initiated by Watsuji Tetsurô's<sup>3</sup> famous essay *Fûdo. Ningengakuteki kôsansu* 風土 .人間学的考察 (*Milieux. A study of the human interlink*, 1935)<sup>4</sup>. Watsuji himself called it *fûdogaku* 風土学 or *fûdoron* 風土論, and defined it as a hermeneutic phenomenology of the environment ; in other words, a phenomenological geography.

Watsuji's essay dating back to 1935, it may be considered as one of the first, if not the first manifestation of phenomenology in geography. However, Watsuji was not a geographer ;

<sup>1</sup> Paris : Belin, 2000. 中山元訳『風土学序説』筑摩書房, 2002年.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> In this article, East Asian anthroponyms are given in their normal order, patronymic first.

<sup>4</sup> There exists a very bad English translation. The Chinese translation also completely misses the point. Better read the Spanish, German or French translations.

he was a philosopher, and the first reference which he invokes (though for criticizing it) is not a geographical one ; it is Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. His approach, in sum, was the reverse of that of Éric Dardel's *L'Homme et la Terre. Nature de la réalité géographique* (*Man and the Earth. The nature of geographical reality*, 1952) : not proceeding from geography to Heidegger, but from Heidegger to geography.

Formed as a geographer for my part, my approach was similar to that of Dardel ; and it is via Watsuji's mesology that I came to read Heidegger. Now, provided that one is concerned with « the nature of geographical reality », as Dardel writes, I consider today that reading Heidegger is essential in that respect ; and it is especially *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (*The Origin of the Work of Art*)<sup>5</sup> which seems to suggest the ontology which, in my opinion, geography cannot do without for understanding what produces this reality. I intend here to show why.

*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* is certainly the most famous writing of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) on art. It is about a « dispute » (*Streit*) between « the Earth » (*die Erde*) et « the World » (*die Welt*), in those hieratic and sibylline terms which are Heidegger's usual trick and which, intentionally, make their interpretation necessarily uncertain. This « intentionally » which I just wrote is not in the least pejorative ; I understand it, on the contrary, as an invitation to thinking, off the beaten tracks ; that is, simply, to think ; because, at least in philosophy, it is clear that « absolutely precise concepts would block thinking, and a conceptual development presupposes some ambiguity<sup>6</sup> » – we will see later the reason for it.

The unbeaten track, as it happens, will be here an approach of the above text from geography, Japanese thinking, and in the wake of Jakob von Uexküll's (1864-1944) *Umweltlehre* (mesology). The reason for it is triple : first, the Earth (with a capital E, since, concretely, the matter is about planet Earth<sup>7</sup>, which bears all the rest), as well as the world, are traditionally the object of geography ; second, whatever Heidegger may have said or rather not said, Japanese philosophy was one of the sources of his thought<sup>8</sup> ; and third, Uexküll's thought also deeply influenced him<sup>9</sup> in the years preceding *the Origin of the Work of Art*, which, undoubtedly, bears the mark of it.

These three reasons will lead me to seeing, in *the Origin of the Work of Art*, a majestic allegory of the trajection (*tsûtai* 通態) which, from that which Uexküll calls *Umgebung* (the raw environmental datum, the environment), opens out on the Earth that « human abode » which is the ecumene (from the Greek οἰκουμένη or οἰκουμένη γῆ, humanly inhabited earth) ; a process in which art plays the role of a scout, and which can be understood by referring to the « predicate logic » (*jutsugo ronri* 述語論理) put forward by Nishida Kitarô (1870-1945).

<sup>5</sup> Initially written in 1935, and slightly reworked thereafter. I refer here to the 2012 edition, Frankfurt am Main : Vittorio Klostermann.

<sup>6</sup> Paul FEYERABEND, *La Tyrannie de la science*, Paris : Seuil, 2014 (*Ambiguità e armonia : lezioni trentine*, 2011), p. 145.

<sup>7</sup> True, Heidegger writes (*Der Ursprung...*, *op. cit.*, p. 28) : « From what this word [*die Erde*] says here, we must dismiss the image of a material mass laid in strata as well as that, astronomical, of a planet. Earth is the womb in which the coming out takes back, as such, all that which comes out. In all that which comes out, the Earth is present as that which puts in safety (*Die Erde ist das, wohin das Aufgehen alles Aufgehende und zwar als ein solches zurückbirgt. Im Aufgehenden west die Erde als das Bergende*) » (my transl.) ; but I hope to show that this allegory, contrary to an ἀλήθεια, veils (λήθει) deliberately that which, concretely, is indeed the Earth both as our planet, the environment (*Umgebung*), the ground (*Boden*) and the subject (*subjectum*, ὑποκείμενον, S) founding any human world.

<sup>8</sup> This theme has been developed by Reinhard MAY, *Ex oriente lux. Heideggers Werk unter ostasiatischem Einfluss*, Stuttgart : F. Steiner Verlag, 1989 ; which Graham Parkes translated under the title *Heidegger's hidden Sources. East Asian Influences on his Work*, London : Routledge, 1996.

<sup>9</sup> This fact was stressed, among others, by Giorgio AGAMBEN, *L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale* (*The Open. The human and the animal*), Torino : Bollati Boringhieri, 2002.

To begin with, let us define the meaning which the two terms *ecumene* and *trajection* have in mesology<sup>10</sup>. *Ecumene*, in the French *écoumène*, is traditionally a masculine word in geography, but it is feminine in mesology, since it is the gender of οἰκουμένη in Greek as well as that of the maternity of Γῆ or Γαῖα, Mother Earth. In mesology, it is *the relationship of humankind with the Earth*; in other words, the whole of human milieux (*Umwelten*), each of which is the particular relationship of a certain society with the environment (the environmental datum, *Umgebung*). A milieu corresponds indeed to what Uexküll calls *Umwelt*, and which he distinguishes categorically from the *Umgebung*<sup>11</sup>. It is singular, proper to a certain species or a certain human society, whereas the environment is universal, given to all just as it is. And in the same way, at another scale, the *ecumene* is proper to humankind; it is not the biosphere, which is universal. The reason for it is that the *ecumene* is eco-techno-symbolical, whereas the biosphere is only ecological (schematically said, since other living beings do not totally ignore technology and, to some degree, do have their proper semiospheres).

As for *trajection*, it is the evolving process in which the environment is anthropized by technology and humanized by symbol, which makes of it a human milieu, and in which, simultaneously, by effect in return (a feedback), this milieu or ambient world conditions the humans themselves, making them indefinitely more human; and so on. In a word, *trajection* is a *cosmosomatization*: eco-techno-symbolically, it makes our body our world, and our world our body. For instance, technology allows us, via a robot, to extend our hand to a comet millions of kilometers away, take a piece of it and bring it back here in order to examine it more closely; while all this operation is physiologically alive as our body in the form of neuronal connections. Without conceptualizing *trajection* as such, André Leroi-Gourhan (1911-1986) has demonstrated the essence of it regarding the emergence of *Homo sapiens*. One can summarize his thesis as the correlation between hominization, humanization and anthropization.<sup>12</sup> *Mutatis mutandis*, regarding the living in general, Imanishi Kinji (1902-1992) expressed the same idea with a formula which runs through his entire works « subjectivation of the environnement, environnementalization of the subject » (*kankyô no shutaika, shutai no kankyôka* 環境の主体化、主体の環境化)<sup>13</sup>.

In sum, the reality of milieux is neither properly objective (since it supposes an interpretation of the environment), nor properly subjective (since it presupposes the environment); it is *trajective*.

Now, this process, *trajection*, is analogous to what in logic is a predication, in which, in this instance, the environmental datum (the *Umgebung*) is in the position of the logical subject S: that which the matter is about, and which, here, is *seized as something* (*concaptum*: conceived of as a certain predicate P) by our senses, action, mind and words, which make it the *trajective* reality (S/P) of a certain milieu.

Knowing besides that, in the history of European thought, « *substance & accidents in metaphysics correspond to subject and predicate in logic* »<sup>14</sup>, let us now see what *trajectivity*

<sup>10</sup> For more details, see Augustin BERQUE, *La mésologie, pourquoi et pour quoi faire ? (Mesology, why and what for ?)*, Nanterre La Défense : Presses universitaires de Paris Ouest, 2014 (木岡伸夫訳『風土学はなぜ、何のために』関西大学出版部、2019年) ; and *Glossaire de mésologie (A Glossary of Mesology)*, Bastia : Éoliennes, 2018. I have introduced the concept of *trajection* in *Le Sauvage et l'artifice. Les Japonais devant la nature*, Paris : Gallimard, 1986 (transl. by Ros Schwartz Japan. *Nature, artifice and Japanese culture*, Yelvertoft Manor : Pilkington, 1997 ; 篠田勝英訳『風土の日本. 自然と文化の通態』、筑摩書房、1988年).

<sup>11</sup> Jakob von UEXKÜLL, *Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen (Raids into Animal and Human Milieux)*, Hamburg : Rowohlt, 1956 (1934).

<sup>12</sup> André LEROI-GOURHAN, *Le Geste et la parole (Gesture and Word)*, Paris : Albin Michel, 1964, 2 vol.

<sup>13</sup> This formula can be seen in his first book (*Seibutsu no sekai [The World of the Living]*, 1941) as well as in one of the last ones (*Shutaisei no shinkaron [Subjecthood in Evolution]*, 1980).

<sup>14</sup> As reminds us *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, Fifth Edition, headword « substance ».

corresponds to in onto/logical (both ontological and logical) terms. The subject, as well as substance, is that which « lies beneath » (ὑποκείμενον, *subjectum*), the « standing beneath » (ὑπόστασις, *substantia*). The predicate is « what is said » (*dicatum*) « in front of » (*prae*), i.e. in front of the subject, and the accident is « what falls » (*cadere*) « thereon » (*ad*), i.e. on the substance. Let us add that, for Nishida as well as for Aristotle<sup>15</sup>, the subject is substantial (*υ* 有), whereas the predicate is unsubstantial (*mu* 無) ; and that moreover, for Nishida, the world is predicative<sup>16</sup> – it is a « predicate-world », *jutsugo sekai* 述語世界 –, and we shall then have the principal ingredients of the following hypothesis : the dispute between the Earth and the World, in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, is nothing else than the relation between substance and accident, subject and predicate in the trajectory of reality in general, as well as those of geography in particular.

This is what we shall now have to argue.

## § 2. The *as* of reality

If Nishida manages to pose that the world is predicative and unsubstantial, it is in a perspective derived from Buddhism, which will not concern us here. Let us rather conceive of the world like in geography, that is, as that which makes the earthly datum appear as a complex of resources, constraints, risks and amenities which the diverse societies, in the course of history, arrange in configurations which depend on their respective cultures, and therefore are not universal but casual and contingent. This contingency is that which the French school of human geography – that of Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918) and his disciples – have put forward in what historian Lucien Febvre (1878-1956) qualified as *possibilism* ; which means that, would the environmental datum be the same, it will be used differently according to the diverse societies<sup>17</sup>. So, there is no determinism – the environment does not determine the forms of civilization –, but diverse actualizations (ἐνέργειαι) of a general potency (δύναμις), the relation between the two terms (environment and civilization) being contingent. It is not mechanical, but historico-medial, as life itself is.

Carrying on with this idea, but in a different form, I later argued that the object of geography should be the ecumene, that is « the Earth inasmuch as it is humanized » and that the geographer's distinctive feature should then be « to pose the question of this 'inasmuch as' (*en tant que*), where the physical and the social only hold in relation to each other », thus generating « affordances (*prises*), which are the resources, constraints, risks and amenities constitutive of the ecumene »<sup>18</sup> ; in other words, that which makes geographical reality appear (φαίνειν) *as* such, in a certain order (κόσμος). That is the *cosmophany* of our world (κόσμος). The said affordances being trajectory, they do not exist in themselves (*an sich, en soi*), but *as something* (*als etwas, en tant que quelque chose*). For instance (schematizing to excess), oil (petroleum) is a resource *as* fuel only inasmuch as you have invented the combustion engine ; otherwise, it is nothing else than a geological datum – the raw datum of the *Umgebung*, which in itself is not a resource, and ultimately does not exist for the concerned society. For example, oil in the Arctic, for millenia, did not exist for the Inuit, though it was there lying

<sup>15</sup> On this question, see Robert BLANCHÉ et Jacques DUBUCS, *La Logique et son histoire (Logic and its history)*, Paris : Armand Colin, 1996 (1970), chap. II.

<sup>16</sup> See NISHIDA Kitarô, *Basho (Place, 1926)*, in *Nishida Kitarô zenshû (Nishida's Complete Works)*, Tokyo : Iwanami, 1966, vol. IV.

<sup>17</sup> Lucien FEBVRE, *La Terre et l'évolution humaine. Introduction géographique à l'histoire (The Earth and Human Evolution. A Geographical Introduction to History)*, Paris : Albin Michel, 1922.

<sup>18</sup> Augustin BERQUE, « Espace, milieu, paysage, environnement (*Space, milieu, landscape, environment*) », p. 352-369 in Antoine BAILLY, Robert FERRAS, Denise PUMAIN (ed.) *Encyclopédie de géographie*, Paris : Economica, 1992, p. 367 and 368.

(ὑποκειμένον) under their feet. It had not yet been *trajected out* (actualized). In sum, *it was there for nothing*.

At the time, not having read Uexküll yet, I did not know that I would find again the same idea in his writings, almost to the letter, yet about animals, and professed half a century earlier. My concept of « prise » (hold) had rather been inspired by that of *affordance* in James Gibson (1904-1979)<sup>19</sup>, who, however, did not speak of « as ». His purpose did not concern hermeneutic phenomenology, whereas for my part, by reading Watsuji, I had discovered the link with the problem of *ecumene*.

In his essay *Fûdo*, Watsuji introduces the concept of *fûdosei* 風土性, which he defines in the first line of the book as « the structural moment of human existence » (*ningen sonzai no kôzô keiki* 人間存在の構造契機). The expression *kôzô keiki* (structural moment) translates the German *Strukturmoment*, a familiar notion in German philosophy, among others in Heidegger. It means here the dynamic coupling of the two sides of human beings : the individual (*hito* 人) and its relational milieu (*aida* 間), a coupling which produces the human in its plenary unity (*ningen* 人間, a current term in the sense of « human being », but which, in Watsuji, comes to take the particular meaning of « human interlink »). Watsuji criticizes Heidegger for having ignored this coupling, a lack which eventually makes the *Dasein* a mere *hito*, not a genuine *ningen*<sup>20</sup>. For rendering this *Strukturmoment*, I accordingly have translated *fûdosei* with « médiance » (*mediance*), from the latin *medietas*, which means « half ». The human in its plenitude is indeed composed with two complementary and indissociable « halves » : the individual and its milieu, which, in the case of the *ecumene* (not to be reduced to the biosphere) is eco-techno-symbolical.

Now, Watsuji accompanies this concept of mediance (the individual/medial synthesis) with the affirmation that the milieu (*fûdo* 風土) must not be confused with the natural environment (*shizen kankyô* 自然環境). The environment is indeed an object (that of the science of ecology), whereas the milieu exists only inasmuch it is lived by a subject – individual or collective –, whose subjecthood (*shutaisei* 主体性) is therefore the prerequisite of mediance, that « concrete ground » (*gutaiteki jiban* 具体的地盤) of human existence ; whereas the environment, as an object of science, has been abstracted from it.

Watsuji's position differs in this way from the scientific point of view (which indeed, in principle, is not a point of view, but a look from nowhere). It invokes, on the contrary, the standpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology, the principle of which is the *art of interpreting* (ἐρμηνεύειν) how reality appears (φαίνει) to a certain being. Yet, the fact is probably that this conception of mediance was inspired to Watsuji by the natural sciences, in this instance Uexküll's mesology (*Umweltlehre*), which he may have heard of during his stay in Germany in 1927-1928. If not so, it is difficult to explain the perfect homology of the principles which found his mesology (*fûdoron* 風土論) as well as that of Uexküll (*Umweltlehre*), the only difference being that the former is only about human milieux (the *ecumene*), whereas the latter is about animal milieux (one can say about the milieux of living beings in general). Indeed,

<sup>19</sup> James GIBSON, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*, Boston, Houghton & Mifflin, 1979. I have commented this source in *Médiance, de milieux en paysages (Mediance, from milieux to landscapes)*, Paris, Belin/RECLUS, 1990, 三宅京子訳『風土としての地球』筑摩書房、1994年 ; and in *Écoumène, op. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> One of the proofs of this fact being that the *Dasein*, though professed as a *Mitsein* (being-with), is after all abstracted as a « being toward death » (*Sein zum Tode*), whereas the concrete human (*ningen* 人間) is for Watsuji a « being toward life » (*sei e no sonzai* 生への存在), whose social and medial existence goes on after the individual's biological death. I have shown in *Poétique de la Terre. Histoire naturelle et histoire humaine, essai de mésologie*, Paris, Belin, 2014 (transl. by Anne-Marie Feenberg, *Poetics of the Earth. Natural History and Human History*, London : Routledge, 2019), that there is in that matter an internal contradiction in Heidegger's thesis, and that it is Watsuji who is consistent.

Uexküll too postulates that the animal is not an object but a subject – it is a « driver » (*Maschinist*), not a machine –, and for that reason, the *Umwelt* (milieu) must not be confused with the *Umgebung*, or objective environment. (One should be aware that Uexküll has criticized the French word « milieu » for being deterministic, which it indeed was before Vidal de la Blache. On the contrary, throughout the present paper, I understand this word in the post-Vidalian acceptance, which corresponds to Uexküll's *Umwelt* and Watsuji's *fūdo* 風土).

It is true that Uexküll did not create a concept integrating these principles, such as that of mediance. On the other hand, he created a rich terminology which one can correlate with the *ecumenal as* (*l'en-tant-que écouméнал*), and thus with trajection – mediance being the state produced by the process of trajection. He shows indeed, by using the experimental method of modern science, that the environmental datum does never exist in itself for the concerned animal, but always as something specific to that animal, proper to its species but not to another one. That « something », therefore, is never a mere object – « an animal can never get in touch with an object (*mit einem Gegenstand in Beziehung treten*) »<sup>21</sup> –, if not as a « holder of significance » (*Bedeutungsträger*), a « role » (*Rolle*) which the animal subject confers to such or such feature of the environment, making it exist according to a certain « tone » (*Ton*). Consequently, according to the species concerned, the objective features of the environment never have the same role – never exist as the same reality – in animal milieux (*Umwelten*). Though an object *is* one and the same, it *exists as* different things. For example, the same grass will exist as food (*Esston*) for a cow, as an obstacle (*Hinderniston*) for an ant, as a beverage (*Trinkton*) for a cicada larva, as a shelter (*Schutzton*) for a beetle, etc..

Basing on one and the same *Umgebung*, this « making exist as » – the casting of roles in the respective theaters of the different *Umwelten* – is called by Uexküll « tonation » (*Tönung*). That is nothing else than a trajection, in other words a predication of the environmental datum (which is here in the position of a logical subject S) as the role (which is here in the position of a certain predicate P) which the animal confers to that datum. This can be summed up with a formula : *reality (r) is S as P*, or  $r = S/P$ . This principle holds for any reality, among others for geographical realities. However, Uexküll not being particularly a logician nor a metaphysician, he did not develop his mesology in that direction. Heidegger, on the other hand, has operatively understood that *as (als)* as both a logical and an ontological problem – an *onto/logical* problem.

### § 3. From Uexküllian *Tönung* to Heideggerian *als*

This *Tönung*, which from a mesological point of view is a trajection, has so profoundly marked Heidegger's ontology that he dedicated to it a good part of his 1929-1930 seminar, the text of which was published after his death under the title *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik)*<sup>22</sup>. True, by a subtle shift, the question there is that of *Grundstimmung* (basic mood) rather than that of *Ton* and *Tönung* ; but the idea remains the same, except that Heidegger precises the matter. For example, the Uexküllian demonstration according to which

« All the richness of the world surrounding the tick (*die Zecke umgebende Welt*) shrinks (*schnurrt zusammen*) and is transformed into a poor pattern (*ein ärmliches Gebilde*), essentially composed with only three sensible signs (*Merkmalen*) and three agible signs (*Wirkmalen*) : it is its milieu (*ihre Umwelt*). However, the poorness (*Ärmlichkeit*) of the milieu conditions the certainty of the activity, and certainty is more important than richness »<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> *Streifzüge...*, op. cit. p. 94.

<sup>22</sup> Frankfurt am Main : Klostermann, 1983.

<sup>23</sup> *Streifzüge...*, op. cit. p. 29. My transl.

This statement unfurls, in Heidegger, into the famous thesis that the stone is « worldless » (*weltlos*), the animal « worldpoor » (*weltarm*), and the human « worldforming » (*weltbildend*).<sup>24</sup> One shall not fail to notice, besides, that, in Uexküll, speaking of the « poorness » of the tick's world is contradictory, since it is only relatively to the *Umgebung* (i.e. the *Umwelt* of our science) that this world can be judged to be poor and reduced to a simple pattern. From the point of view of the tick, on the other hand, its *Umwelt* is just as complete and real as Plato, from his human point of view, judged the *kosmos* (that is, his *Umwelt*) to be, in the last few lines of the *Timaeus* <sup>25</sup>. As for Heidegger, from a bluntly anthropocentric (and, more precisely said, logocentric) standpoint, he sees « worldpoorness as a lack of world » (*Weltarmut als Entbehren von Welt*)<sup>26</sup>.

Yet Heidegger certainly innovates in considering that matter from an onto/logical point of view. He writes that

« Statement, judgment, in ancient philosophy, was called λόγος. Now, λόγος – that is the main theme of *logic*. (...) The question about the essence of the world (*dem Wesen der Welt*) is a fundamental question of *Metaphysics*. The problem of world (*das Weltproblem*) as a fundamentaal problem of metaphysics is led back to logic. Logic is thus the actual basis of metaphysics »<sup>27</sup>.

Then, commenting the enunciative clause in Aristotle, he shows that the Stagirite, when talking of σύνθεσις,

« (...) wants to say what we call the *structure of 'as'* (*die >als<Struktur*). He wants to say that, without freely and explicitly forging ahead in the dimension of that problem. The *structure of 'as'*, the *primarily unifying perception* (*vorgängige einheitbildende Vernehmen*) of *something as something* (*etwas als etwas*), is the *condition of the possibility of truth or falseness* of the λόγος »<sup>28</sup>.

Heidegger assimilates<sup>29</sup> this « primarily unifying perception » with the predication of « a as b », which makes that « a is b ». It is the « structural moment of the openness » (*Strukturmoment der Offenbarkeit*) by dint of which the things appear as something. It is the *as* of the essent as such (*das Seiende als solches*), in sum the *qua* of the *ens qua ens*, the ἦ of the ὄν ἦ ὄν.

In Heidegger's purpose, « this quite elementary 'as' (...) is that which is forbidden to the animal » (*dem Tiere versagt ist*)<sup>30</sup>. Such a statement is obviously logocentric, and here is the point where Heidegger diverges from Uexküll. Indeed, for Heidegger, while admitting that a lizard, differing from the rock on which it is basking in the sun, is not simply matter,

« When we say that the lizard lies on the rock, we should cross out the word 'rock', in order to indicate that that on which it lies is certainly given to it in some way (*irgendwie gegeben*), but not *as* rock (*nicht als Felsplatte*). The crossing out does not only mean : something else, and

<sup>24</sup> *Die Grundbegriffe...*, § 42.

<sup>25</sup> Where, in the last few lines, it is said that the *kosmos* is « very big, very good, very beautiful and very perfect » (μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος).

<sup>26</sup> *Die Grundbegriffe...*, § 46.

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 418. My transl.

<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 456. Heidegger's italics. My transl.

<sup>29</sup> I summarize hereafter the content of § 69.

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 416.

taken as something else, but : not accessible at all *as essent (überhaupt nicht als Seiendes zugänglich)* »<sup>31</sup>.

Thus, the animal is « excluded out of the openness of the essent » (*ausgeschlossen aus der Offenbarkeit vom Seiendem*)<sup>32</sup>, which on the other hand is indissociable from human saying and acting, and through which the environmental datum is specified (one should here remember Vidalian possibilism, or even Augustinian free will). The animal, for its part, is unable to distantiate itself from its milieu, since it is « beholden » (*benommen*) to the very hold it has on it ; and thus, its behaviour (*benehmen*) is impulsively dictated to it by its milieu<sup>33</sup>.

In the lack of hindsight of this « beholdenness » (*Benommenheit*), there cannot be, properly said, any opening of a world ; there is only what Heidegger calls « aperture in beholdenness » (*das Offensein in der Benommenheit*). To come back to Uexküll, this corresponds with what he calls *Umwelt*, but which Heidegger is keen to distinguish from *Welt*, i.e. world properly said, because, in sum, the world cannot really open itself, by opening the essent as such, if not by dint of the symbolical (the saying) and the technical (the acting) systems proper to humankind.

The *Grundbegriffe* thus come to the thesis – analogous to the emergence of the ecumene out of the biosphere – of « world forming as that which goes on fundamentally in the *Dasein* » (*Weltbildung als Grundgeschehen im Dasein*) and of « essence as the reign of the world » (*das Wesen als das Walten der Welt*). And, to come back this time to the Nishidian idea that the world is predicative, this is to say that, in what is for us reality ( $r = S/P$ ), the essence of things is dictated to us by the predicate ; in other words, by the manner (*Art* in German) – i.e. P – we have to take S – i.e. the raw datum of the environment, or the « in-itself » (*an sich*) of the Earth (the most fundamental  $\text{ὑποκείμενον}$  : *S par excellence*).

It is now time to come more directly to *The Origin of the Work of Art*.

#### § 4. The work of art as the trajectory of the Earth into a certain world

Though « origin » does indeed translate *Ursprung*, English here does not evoke the image which the German word expresses ; viz, the prime (*ur*) springing (*Sprung*) of something which is going to exist – *ek-sist* (stand out) – by springing out of something else. To go directly to the conclusion which I intend to draw here, it is the birth of reality (S/P) out of Mother Earth (S) by dint of the mundane ‘as’ put into enaction ( $\text{ἐνέργεια}$ ) by art – a certain way (P, *Art*) of seizing S. It is *the Earth seized as a world*, and the work of art is in that ‘as’.

Is that really what Heidegger wants to say ? The intended obscurity of his prose allows indeed to discuss about it indefinitely, but what we have just seen (§1-§3) nevertheless obliges us to frame the matter in a certain sense. The author who expresses himself in *The Origin of the Work of Art* is not another man than the one who, five years earlier, wrote much more explicitly the *Grundbegriffe* (the basic concepts), and he has not, as by mutation, got rid of the *Grundstimmung* (the basic mood) which he professes there ; he has not quitted his ground (*Grund*). Moreover, this not only a presumption, and it is not only about the sole Heidegger. Then, when he writes the hieratic lines

« The temple-work, standing there, opens a world and establishes it back on the earth, which itself, in such a way (*dergestalt*), first appears as a home ground (*heimatlicher Grund*). But

<sup>31</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 291-292. My transl.

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 358.

<sup>33</sup> As can be seen, Heidegger plays here (*op. cit.*, § 46) on the relation between *benommen* (« dazed, stupid »), but also past participle of *benehmen* : behave, act) and *benehmen* (« behaviour », but also « take, take away, deprive »), both deriving from *nehmen* (take) with the *be*, which transitivates in order to make such and such. In sum, for Heidegger, the animal is prisoner of its own milieu.



humans and animals, plants and things are never given and known as unchanging objects (*unveränderliche Gegenstände*) (...). It is the temple which, in its standing there (*Dastehen*), first gives to things their aspect (*Gesicht*) and to humans the prospect (*Aussicht*) on themselves »<sup>34</sup>,

one must not forget that, before him, Uexküll had already shown that an animal can never get in touch with a mere object (see above § 2), since it is not with the abstract objects (S) of the environment (*Umgebung*), but with the concrete things (S/P) of its milieu (*Umwelt*) that it is in relation with.

Now, if these things exist concretely, it is by dint of their growing-together – their *cum-crescere* (past participle *concretus*) – with what Plato would have called the γένεσις of the animal itself in the sensible world (κόσμος αἰσθητός), that is, in its proper milieu (χώρα). In the concrete reality ( $r = S/P$ ) of that *Umwelt*, indeed, the diverse things and beings grow and go together because living beings have the potency (δύναμις) to seize the objects of the environment (*Umgebung*) in a certain way (*Art* in German) and, in such a way (*dergestalt*) to actualize (ἐνεργεῖν) them as certain concrete things, in a trajectory adequation with their own existence, that is, with their own prospect on themselves (which they lose when they die).

This, of course, is not Uexküll's vocabulary, but it is what he shows when he speaks of a « counterpoint as motif of morphogenesis » (*Kontrapunkt als Motiv der Formbildung*)<sup>35</sup> in the living world, and when he poses that

« The fundamental technical rule, which comes to expression in the floweriness (*Blumenhaftigkeit*) of the bee and in the beeness (*Bienenhaftigkeit*) of the flower, can also be applied to the other examples introduced. It is sure that the spider's web is formed flyly (*fliegenhaft*), since the spider itself is flyly. Being flyly means that the spider, in its constitution, has taken up certain elements of the fly. Not from a determined fly, but from the archetype (*Urbild*) of the fly. Better said, the flyness (*Fliegenhaftigkeit*) of the spider means that it has taken up in its bodily composition (*Körpercomposition*) certain motifs from the fly-melody (*Fliegenmelodie*) »<sup>36</sup>.

Indeed, for Uexküll, the « technology of nature » (*die Naturtechnik*) functions as a symphony, the diverse elements of which are in « contrapuntal relationships » (*kontrapunktischen Beziehungen*)<sup>37</sup>. By forming itself, each element forms the other ones. This is to say that the « as » through which a milieu opens up, out of the environment, modifies the environment itself. In sum, it fulfils not only a cosmogenetic, but also an ontogenetic function.

Now, in a human world, it is human work which fulfils this function, yet especially through technology and symbol, acting and saying. Accordingly, in the instance chosen by Heidegger, it is the temple which makes the things all around exist as what they are in that milieu :

« Standing there, the construction [i.e. the temple] rests on the rock. This resting-on of the work on the rock raises outward out of the rock the dark of its unstructured and yet pressed toward nothing support. Standing there, the construction holds against the storm passing over it, thus showing first the storm itself in its violence. The gleam and the light of its stones, which seem to receive them only from the mercy of the sun, yet first bring to appearance the light of the day, the width of the sky, the darkness of the night »<sup>38</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> *Der Ursprung...*, op. cit., p. 28-29. My transl.

<sup>35</sup> *Streifzüge...*, op. cit., p. 145.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 145. My transl.

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>38</sup> *Der Ursprung...*, op. cit., p. 28. My transl.

And what means that mysterious « pressed toward nothing » (*zu nichts gedrängten*) ? It comes to light if one remembers that Uexküll had shown that what, in the *Umgebung*, does not partake of the *Umwelt* of such or such animal, does not exist for that animal. What exists for an animal is only what enters in the « functional circle » (*Funktionskreis*) between its « agible world » (*Wirkwelt*) and its « sensible world » (*Merkwelt*)<sup>39</sup> ; because « as many performances (*Leistungen*) an animal is able accomplish, as many objects (*Gegenstände*) it is able to distinguish in its milieu »<sup>40</sup> ; but as for the rest of the environmental datum, the animal does'nt care of it, and it is literally there for nothing. In other words, it is not trajected as something – just like petroleum, formerly, did not exist for the Inuit, as we have seen above (§ 2).

This raw support which is there for nothing – viz that which, in the *Umgebung*, is not discovered, opened up as something – is the lying-beneath (ὑποκείμενον) which remains entrapped within the in-itself (*an sich*) of a mere object (S)<sup>41</sup>, identical to itself and inaccessible as long as it has not been trajected within a certain world (P) to become a certain thing (S/P). Yet even that which, by dint of a certain agent, has been discovered in the guise of a certain predicate (P) and, in that way, has become something real (S/P), nevertheless keeps on being an object in itself (S). This raw material is that which, at the same time, opens up into a world as something and retires into the object it still is in itself. In other words,

« That toward which the work retires, and that which it makes come out in this retirement, we have named it the Earth (*die Erde*). It is the coming forth-hiding (*das Hervorkommend-Bergende*). The Earth is the pressed toward nothing effortless-tireless (*das...Mühelose-Unermüdliche*). On the Earth and in it, the historial human finds its abode in the world. In that the work sets up a world, it sets the Earth forth (*Indem das Werk eine Welt aufstellt, stellt es die Erde her*). This setting-forth must here be thought of in the strict sense. The work moves the Earth over and maintains it in the open of a world. *The work lets the Earth be an earth (Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein,)* »<sup>42</sup>.

Then, in mesological terms, out of what does the 'as' (the work, the ἐνέργεια) set the Earth forth ? Out of the fetters of the identity of S, in order to make it the reality of a concrete place in the ecumene (S/P). True, Heidegger says that « this setting-forth must be here thought of in the strict sense » (*das Herstellen ist hier im strengen Sinne des Worts zu denken*), but he would not have lived up to his destiny of « magus of the Black Forest »<sup>43</sup> if he had clarified the said sense, by bringing it closer to the >als<Struktur his own *Grundbegriffe*, a few years before, explicitly talked about ; that is to say the assumption of S as P, which produces (*stellt her*) the reality S/P.

What, on the other hand, is explicitly said in the *Ursprung* is that, for Heidegger, this assumption is the un-veiling (ἀ-λήθεια) of truth (ἀλήθεια), out of the darkness of its raw support, the Earth. This operation (ἐνέργεια) is clearly that in which S, dis-covered and opened out as P, becomes S/P : a certain reality in the ecumene ; but it is not simple, because

« Unconcealment of the essent (*Unverborgenheit des Seiendes*), that is not a state only pre-existing (*vorhandener Zustand*), but an event (*Geschehnis*). Unconcealment (truth) is neither a quality of the thing in the sense of the essent, nor of the statement. (...) (...) *As unconcealment,*

<sup>39</sup> See fig. 3 in *Streifzüge...*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>40</sup> *Streifzüge...*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>41</sup> Remind that the logician's subject (S : what the matter is about) corresponds to the physicist's object (S : what one observes and measures).

<sup>42</sup> *Der Ursprung...*, *op. cit.*, p. 32. My transl.

<sup>43</sup> Jean-Claude Beaune's expression.

*belongs to the essence of truth this disavowal (Verweigern) in the mode of the double concealment (in der Weise des zwiefachen Verbergens). Truth in its essence is un-truth »<sup>44</sup>.*

That truth should be un-truth, this looks remarkably zen-like ; yet it is clear that insamuch truth is the « as » of the ἀ-λήθεια, it is neither the in-itself of S, nor the for-oneself of P (what S exists as– *ek-sists, ur-springt [prime-springs out]* – for a certain being). « In the mode of the double concealment », it is neither one nor the other, neither S nor P but, inbetween, S as P –, and therefore belongs to a *meso-logic*, a *logic of the included middle*, which is neither a logic of the identity of the subject (that of Aristotle, which founded scientific rationalism on the absolutization of S)<sup>45</sup>, nor a logic of the identity of the predicate (that of Nishida, *jutsugo ronri* 述語論理, which is of religious essence with its absolutization of P)<sup>46</sup>. In other words, it is that which is enacted precisely in the « dispute » (*Streit*) between the Earth (S) and the world (P).

Then, would the truth in question belong rather to art than to science ? That is indeed what Heidegger says :

« Art lets truth originate (*Die Kunst läßt die Wahrheit entspringen*). Art lets spring forth (*erspringt*) as founding the probation of truth in the work. Let something spring forth, let it come into being in a founding spring (*im stiftenden Sprung*) out of the origin of the essence (*aus der Wesensherkunft*), that is what means the word *Ursprung* (origin) »<sup>47</sup>,

whereas

« On the contrary, science is not a prime-springing event (*ursprüngliches Geschehen*) of truth, but always the exploitation (*Ausbau*) of an already opened region of truth »<sup>48</sup>,

which leads Heidegger to this conclusion :

« The essence of art is the poem (*Das Wesen der Kunst ist die Dichtung*). The essence of the poem is the foundation of the truth (*die Stiftung der Wahrheit*) »<sup>49</sup>.

Now, from the point of view of mesology, the assumption of S as P is reality ( $r = S/P$ ) rather than truth, which in principle is the adequation of P to S ( $P = S$ ). This, at least, is truth in the sense of science – but this sense is ideal and abstract, since the very fact of attaining S is to predicate it as some P ; in other words, concretely, make it exist as something, and thus, in fact, unveiling a new reality (S/P). In the end, the two truths would meet halfway – somewhere in the middle (μέσος, milieu) –, yet from an opposite approach, because, whereas the poem (art) lets

<sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 41. My transl.

<sup>45</sup> Once again, remind that the logician's subject (S : what the matter is about) corresponds to the physicist's object (S : what one observes and measures).

<sup>46</sup> On this theme, see my *La mésologie...*, *op. cit.*, and more specifically « La logique du lieu dépasse-t-elle la modernité ? (Does the logic of place overcome modernity?) », p. 41-52, and « Du prédicat sans base : entre *mundus* et *baburu*, la modernité » (Of the predicate without a basis : between *mundus* and *bubble*, modernity), p. 53-62 in Livia MONNET (ed.) *Approches critiques de la pensée japonaise au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Montréal : Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2002. NB : Nishida speaks indifferently of « logic of the predicate » and of « logic of place » (*basho no ronri* 場所の論理). On the « meso-logic » of mesology, see my articles « Mesology (風土論) in the light of Yamauchi Tokuryū's *Logos and lemma* », APF Series 1, *Philosophizing in Asia*, UTCP (The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy), Uehiro Booklet 3, 2013, p. 9-25, and on the webpage <https://ecoumene.blogspot.com/> « La méso-logique des milieux / 環世界と風土の中論的論理 (The meso-logic of milieux) » (december 2013).

<sup>47</sup> *Ursprung...*, *op. cit.*, p. 65-66.

<sup>48</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 49. My transl.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

the Earth free out of its self-identity in order to open it into new worlds, science dissects the world in order to find the Earth back. In that way happens, in an indefinitely resumed dispute, in an ourobores or rather in a spiral, moving and always to be born (*natura*) anew, the reality of human milieux. That is actually truth, which, concretely if not abstractly, is neither S nor P, but S as P : the arrangement (κόσμος) of the Earth as a certain world (κόσμος). In sum : the *cosmophany of the Earth*, in that trajectory due to our senses, action, mind and words.

In their onto/logical principle, that is indeed the un-veiling of geographical realities – the resources, constraints, risks and amenities of the ecumene – ; and besides, such also is what a physicist like Bernard d’Espagnat meant when he spoke of « réel voilé » (veiled real)<sup>50</sup> – a quasi Heideggerian, and anyhow a mesological expression, since « the real » is S, which is always « veiled » as P when it becomes reality (S/P) ; except that the *Art und Weise* of science is indeed the opposite of that of art, since d’Espagnat speaks of *veilment* whereas Heidegger speaks of *un-veilment* (ἀ-λήθεια)!

In which way (*in welcher Art, dô iu fû ni* どういう風に) do we eventually interpret the Earth (*die Erde, do* 土)? That is indeed the question of milieu (*fûdo* 風土 – *do* 土 determined in a certain *fû* 風) – : the question of what, for us, is reality<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> Bernard d’ESPAGNAT, *À la recherche du réel. Le regard d’un physicien (In quest of the real. The look of a physicist)*, Paris, Dunod, 2015 (1979) ; *Le réel voilé : analyse des concepts quantiques (The veiled real. An analysis of quantic concepts)*, Paris, Fayard, 1994 ; *Traité de physique et de philosophie (A Treatise of physics and philosophy)*, Paris, Fayard, 2002.

<sup>51</sup> A shorter, less elaborated version of this paper was published as « La cosmophonie des réalités géographiques » (The cosmophany of geographical realities), *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, 2017, vol. 60, n° 171, p. 517-530. I had formerly used for the first time the concept of cosmophany in « Cosmophonie ou paysage » (Cosmophany or landscape), p. 741-744 in Dominique GUILLAUD, Maorie SEYSSET, Annie WALTER (eds.) *Le Voyage inachevé... À Joël Bonnemaïson*, Paris : ORSTOM/PRODIG, 1998.