

Reconsidering the Ili Crisis —The Ili Region under Russian Rule (1871-1881)—

Jin Noda ¹⁾

1) *Organization for Islamic Area Studies, Waseda University, Japan*

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Introduction

The lands that comprise Ili (伊犁) are in an area south of Tian Shan mountain and north of Talji (塔爾奇) mountain, with Narat (那喇特) mountain buttressing the east and the Khorgos (霍爾果斯) River running around the west. The terrain here narrows to the east and gradually opens up to the west, almost forming a triangle. For this reason, Europeans call this land the Ili Delta [Hino 1973: 179].

This portrayal of the topography of the area around Yining—a city in the northern part of what today is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China—comes from HINO Tsutomu,¹ who visited the city in 1907 when it was known as Ili (Ghulja). The Ili River streaming through this delta emerges from its source at Tian Shan, joins with the Khorgos River that today marks the border between China and Kazakhstan, and flows to its end at Lake Balkhash. The river is 601 kilometers long, with a basin that extends over 61,640 square kilometers. The location made it inevitable that the waterway would play a role in the affairs of Kazakhstan, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union, and the area around Ili likewise had deep connections with Russia.

After being freed from the grasp of the Qing by the Muslim rebellions of the 1860s, Ili—which during Qing times had been the seat of the Xinjiang government—and its surroundings were occupied by the Russian Empire from 1871-1881. Previous research on this event—historically referred to as the “Ili Crisis”—for the most part has analyzed it in some sense from an international relations perspective, taking up the rivalry between Britain and Russia, for example, or the crisis’ relationship to the Yaqub-bek’s dominion that was then seeking to expand its power from its stronghold in southern Xinjiang, or with respect to treaty negotiations between Russia and the Qing.ⁱⁱ But despite the reams of data that have been collected about the Ili region when it was under Russian rule, one has the impression that the occupation period itself has not been examined in detail. Consequently, in this article I will reevaluate the international situation of the time in an effort to tease out the significance of this period of Russian rule and clarify the purpose Russia had for occupying the Ili region. In addition, using statistical and other materials I will also shed light on trade and the use of environmental resources (irrigation, agriculture, livestock farming) in the Ili region, particularly with respect to the case of the Taranchis (Uyghur). My objective in this effort is to examine the significance of Russian rule for this region from a micro-level perspective and indicate what made the region unique while drawing comparisons with the preceding and subsequent periods.ⁱⁱⁱ

For the period of Russian rule, archival materials regarding the secretariat for the Ili region (*Kul’dzhinskii kraï*) remain in Kazakhstan (the fond No. 21 of TsGA RK), but as yet not enough investigation has been done by the author of this article. That English diplomats at the time frequently compiled data from Russian periodicals is quite clear from British Foreign Office (hereafter FO) archival materials, and note should be made of the fact that they can be supplemented to a certain degree by the “*Turkestanskii sbornik*” (“Turkestan collection,” hereafter TS).^{iv} I want to aggressively make use of the articles included in the TS in this paper.

1. Prehistory: The Ili Region during the Qing Dynasty


1.1. Ili’s Makeup

The Ili region today is a part of the Ili-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture inside the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. More precisely, it mostly corresponds to the eight counties (Yining, Huocheng, Nileke, Xinyuan, Gongliu, Tekesi, Zhaosu, and Qapqal Sibe Autonomous County) and one city (Yining City) that comprise the “Ili district” [*Xinjiang Yili kaifa*: 11].^v Since the Russo-Qing border moved slightly eastward under the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in connection with the reversion of the Ili region to the Qing, the term “Ili region” as used in this article refers to a zone that extends beyond the present-day “Ili district” and extends into Kazakhstan.

The population of the Ili district in 1949 stood at 462,655, and reached 1,554,281 by July 1982 [*Xinjiang Yili kaifa*: 14-15]. Reckoning from 1998 statistics, the figure stands at 2,067,372 [*Zizhizhou zhi*: 173]. I will detail this further later, but here it will suffice to say that one of this area’s main characteristics is that comprises numerous peoples, including the Kazakhs who give the prefecture its name, the Uyghur, the Mongols, the Sibes, and others.

Historically, the area had been a stronghold of the Junghar people. Ili was the central city even when “Xinjiang” came into being as a frontier province (*fanbu* 藩部) under the Qing following their conquest of Jungharia (northern Xinjiang) and Kashgaria (southern Xinjiang) because the Ili Military Governor who oversaw the whole of Xinjiang was stationed here. The northern parts of Xinjiang saw large numbers of people migrate there as the area had been emptied by the destruction of the nomadic Junghars. Pressured by the Manchu and Mongol Eight Banner garrisons (駐防滿蒙八旗, with 4,240 men based at *Huiyuan* City and 2,144 stationed at *Huining* City) and the Green Standard

Army (including *Lüying* 綠營, 3,000 men), 1,837 Chahar Mongols, 1,018 Sibe and 1,018 Solons including Daur (both Tungusic peoples), and 1,200 Oyrads^{vi} were settled around Ili around Qianlong 29-30 (1764-1765) and, as *Qitun* (旗屯, banner farms), were made to serve as the occupation forces in their respective locations [Wang 1990: 100].^{vii} Also, Granted *Jasaq*, the nomadic Torghut people who had migrated from the Volga region made their way in 1771 to the area around Ili.



Map 1: Rivers in the Ili Region in the early 20th century (bold lines indicate mountain ranges)^{viii}

We should also note the removal of the settled Muslim peoples in eastern Turkestan called the *Huitun* (回屯); more than 6,000 households of Taranchis^{ix} (*Taranči*; the name for these people from southern Xinjiang means “a person who plants” in the Oyirad language; known as the Uyghur people today) moved to the region around Ili.^x The forced relocation of peasants from southern Xinjiang villages such as Aksu and Yarkand to the Ili region to work the land was also seen in the Junghar era. Regarding their society, they are well known to have adopted a “*beg*” administrative system [Saguchi 1986: 281]; the *Hakim beg* who were at its head were individuals linked to the family lineage that had produced a succession of Turfan kings in Xinjiang.

SAGUCHI Tōru, who has already studied Taranchis society of Ili in great detail, deems the lives of the Taranchis to have been harsh; he has estimated that for the 40 *shi* of grain each household harvested from the one *shi*-worth of the seeds of two kinds of barley and the 5 *dou* of grains and wheat they received, each had to pay a levy of 16 *shi*.^{xi} The *Xinjiang shilue* records that the total tax levy in the year Qianlong 38 (1774) for the 6,000 Taranchis households was determined to be 16 *shi* per household or 96,000 in total. As Saguchi has already noted, this is consistent with the levy mentioned by Radloff of “8 *cho*” (meaning *hu*, a unit of volume corresponding here to 5 *dou* or 0.5 *shi*) each of barley, wheat, rye, and common millet.^{xii} It is no overstatement to say that the very presence of these Taranchis who believed in Islam was to become a remote cause of the Muslim Rebellion in which the Ili region later became entangled.^{xiii} Finally, we should note that a diverse society had taken shape around Ili, as—in addition to the *Huitun* (回屯) and *Qitun* (旗屯)—the Torghuts and Kazakhs also had lands they roamed in the area.

The structure of the city of Ili had its own peculiarities. Seven cities including *Ningyuan* (also known as *Ghulja* or *Jindingsi*, it is referred to as *Kul'dzha* in Russian sources)—also called *Hui-cheng* (回城), this is where Muslims were to live—and *Huiyuan* City, which was the government's headquarters, were clustered around here; as such it took on the appearance of complex city.^{xiv}

1.2. Connections with Russia

From the 1840s onward, it is known that merchants of Russian nationality entered Xinjiang, particularly Ili and Tarbagatai (also known as Chuguchak), and did business despite it all being illegal.^{xv} Demand in Russia for tea and textiles was great and the merchants wanted to conduct trade outside of Kyahkta—which had been the exclusive location for such commerce—in the much-closer Xinjiang. The signing of the Treaty of Kulja between Russia and the Qing in 1851 opened Ili and Tarbagatai to merchants of Russian nationality. The authority to appoint consuls and the right of residence were also granted, and Russian consulates opened in the two cities.

From the start, it seems that Russian government offices under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Western Siberia in the Alatau District and elsewhere issued passports (*bilet*). Studying one example from 1860 shows that the chief of the caravan (*Karavannyi starshina*) is permitted free passage to Ili and Tarbagatai on the basis of Article 4 of the Treaty of Kulja.^{xvi}

Russo-Qing trade entered a new phase [Mi 2005: 61] with this, but an arson attack in the Russian trade zone (*faktoriia*, the Russian trading house) in Tarbagatai in Xianfeng 5 (1855)^{xvii} led trade via the city to become unfavorable [Kasymbaev 1996: 83]. In Ili, too, in addition to the withdrawal of merchants and consular staff in response to the Tarbagatai incident, not even normal business was wanted during the confusion of the Muslim rebellions in Xinjiang during the 1860s,^{xviii} which will be demonstrated in the following section, and with the closure of the consulate by 1866 having become necessary and other factors trade lapsed into a ruinous state [Paine 1996].^{xix} Disorder of this

sort in northern Xinjiang also provided an opportunity for Russia to make advances farther to the north in northwestern Mongolia (toward Kobdo) as well for trade purposes.

Another item Russia directed attention toward related to trade was navigation on the Ili River.^{xx} The convenience of being able to go about by boat near the Qing City of Ili and Russia's Fort Ver-nyi (built 1854, currently the city of Almaty in the Republic of Kazakhstan) was something that could be easily imagined, even if one thought only of transporting cargo. In 1857, the Russian consul requested that goods be transported by boat to the Russian trading house in Ili,^{xxi} but the Qing refused. The original document written in Manchu sent by the Ili Military Governor, addressed to the Russian consul is in the Russian State Military History Archive (RGVIA).^{xxii}

Paralleling these negotiations between the two, in 1856 a Russian merchant named Kuznetsov loaded a flat-bottomed cargo ship with wheat and such and attempted to make his way from Lake Balkhash up river to an Ili branch village (*Iliiskii vyselok*).^{xxiii} In 1872, Fisher went down to the Ili branch village from Kulja (Ningyuan) and conducted research.^{xxiv} However, the river in fact does not seem to be suited for navigation, as Yordashev's failed attempt in 1883 and the like show. HINO Tsutomu, introduced earlier in this paper, wrote:

The water is not of uniform depth in all places, measuring as much as 20 *shaku* [1 shaku = 30 cm] in its deepest and no more than 3 *shaku* at its shallowest. . . . The force of the current is swift, and while it is strong enough to send trees down river, it is otherwise not accommodating for transport. . . . In short, although the Ili River may be useful for water transport as it gradually widens after entering Russian territory, its merits completely disappear within the Xinjiang Province. On the other hand, the benefits of using the river and its tributaries to irrigate the Ili valley are enormous. One sees hamlets in all places alongside it, it is joined to fields and paddies, there are luxuriant trees, and fertile grazing lands. In fact, the Ili creates the most fertile land in Xinjiang.^{xxv}

Russia's commercial intentions aside, it may be salutary to take note of the latter part of Hino's account and consider the Ili River's uses for agricultural production.

2. The Xinjiang Muslim Rebellion of 1864 and Russo-Qing Relations

2.1 The Muslim Rebellion

The Muslim revolt that occurred in 1862 in Shaanxi spread through Gansu to reach Xinjiang, and in Ili, too, *Huimin* (Muslims who spoke the Han Chinese dialect, also known as Tungans^{xxvi}) joined with Taranchis to rise up against the Qing. Detailed analyses may be found in various existing works of research,^{xxvii} so in this article I would like to focus on the differences in trends for each people.

- (1) Taranchis, Tungans: Later became rivals and as I discuss below the Taranchis establish a government
- (2) Kazakhs: Join with the Qing in Tarbagatai but sided with the Muslims in Ili [Noda 2006]
- (3) Sibe: Later fell in with the Taranchis regime [Diiakov 1908]
- (4) Oyrads, Solons, Manchus: Fled to Russian territory in the west^{xxviii}

2.2. Russia's Posture

The Xinjiang Muslim Rebellion also affected neighboring areas in the Russian Empire. The Oyrat army crossed the border particularly around Tarbagatai numerous times from 1865 onward and made incursions into Russian territory [Terent'ev 1875: 125], and the uprising spread toward Kobdo when the Qing government was restored to power in 1869 [Paine 1996: 120].


Moiseev has sifted through the Russian archival sources on Russia's response to the Ili uprising. While troops were moved to Borokhudzhir to prevent the flight of Kazakhs to the Ili region on the one hand [Moiseev 2003: 90], Russia adhered to a non-intervention policy when it came to a request for a relief force from Ili Military Governor, Mingxu (明緒) [Gurevich 1982: 429]. Based on the opinions of West Siberia Governor-General Diugamel' and the instructions Foreign Minister Gorchakov sent to Ambassador Vlangali in Beijing, it seems the reason for this was that there were concerns the Tungans would regard Russia as an enemy [Moiseev 2003: 77-79].

Russian scholar of East Asia, Terent'ev (born in 1837), focused on the effect the rebellion had on Russian trade [Terent'ev 1875: 122]. In this monograph, he indicated that as a result of the revolt, "(1) Russian consulates and trading houses in Ili and Tarbagatai closed, (2) trade that had been making spectacular advances in terms of turnover completely halted, (3) hard-up and ruined settlers rushed to Russian territory, and (4) unrest on the border was relentless, there were incursions into Russian territory, and Russian subjects were attacked." He also deemed the Russian army's non-intervention itself to be linked to the collapse of trade, the disorder in neighboring countries—that is, in the Ili region—and the formation of a fanatical Muslim state, and vividly displayed the heavy blow that the loss of international trade with this region was for Russia.^{xxxix}

Around this time, the Turkestan Governor-Generalship came into being on the Russian side. Established in 1867 with Kaufman as the first Governor-General, the territory was initially created out of the Syr-darya *oblast'* (province) and the Semirech'e *oblast'*; Semirech'e—a word that means "seven rivers" and refers to the Lake Balkhash water system, including the downstream basin of the Ili River—was put under the latter's jurisdiction. More precisely, the Senior Zhuz—one of the three Kazakh tribal unions (*Zhuz*)—that had by this time stood face to face with the Ili region was absorbed into the Russian Empire. The military governor of Semirech'e oblast was Kolpakovsky, the individual who would also be in charge when the Russian army occupied Ili. Many refugees from Qing lands were admitted to Russian territory and negotiations took place between Russia and the Qing regarding indemnities for their return.^{xxx} A special committee was set up in Kopal' in Russia to deal with people from Qing lands.^{xxxi} As of 1871, 1,095 of them had taken Russian citizenship, and most of the other 15,000 people had migrated toward the Kara-Irtysh River (the uppermost reaches of the Irtysh River east of Lake Zaysan) [Terent'ev 1875: 127].

The Treaty of Tarbagatai was concluded at the height of the disorder to deal the western borders of both Russia and Qing China [Moiseev 2003: 64]. With Russia's advance into Central Asia, the need to make Xinjiang's originally undemarcated western border explicit had become a pressing one. The Treaty of Peking signed in 1860 had provided for the establishment of a western border that accorded with those "permanent" *karun* (border guard posts) that did not shift with the seasons [Yoshida 1974: 234], and based on this, the Treaty of Tarbagatai of 1864 set the borders anew. Russia acquired Lake Zaysan as a result and the border the Qing had been supposing—extending to Lake Balkhash in the west—was moved considerably eastward to the area around Ili as well. Based on the terms of the Russo-Qing negotiations noted earlier regarding navigation on the Ili River, we ascertain that Russia at the very least regarded areas as far as Turgen as Qing territory (See **Map 2**); the provisions of the Treaty of Tarbagatai likewise set the border in keeping with that understanding.^{xxxii}

In this way, the frontier between Russia and the Qing was clarified. This signified that the movements of these groups had turned into a matter that had crossed national borders [Noda 2006].



Map 2: Tributaries of the Ili River (source: *Xinjiang shilue*, vol. 4)

3. The Situation on the Eve of the Ili Occupation

3.1 The Taranchis Regime in Ili

Let us first review the process that led to the Ili Crisis from a local perspective. In Ili, the Taranchis and the Tungans at first fought together, working to starve out the garrison at *Mancheng* (Manchu City, *Huiyuan* 惠遠) and forcing its surrender. Enmities subsequently arose between the two parties and in the end the Taranchis established a sultanate (*Sultanstvo*) in May 1867. There is data showing that Aila-khan (also Abil-oghil),^{xxxiii} the man who became the sultan at this time, had already been chosen in 1865 as the amir of the Taranchis [Fedorov 1903: 45].

According to Fedorov, who compiled military statistical records regarding the Ili region, what made it inevitable that Russia would bring about the demise of the sultanate was “the sultan’s threatening posture, the infringements by the Taranchis against the sanctity of our national borders (*narushenie neprikosnovennosti*), and the considerable possibility that Yaqub-bek regime of Kashgaria would grow stronger by making inroads in Ili” [Fedorov 1903: 50]. Also, as Fedorov has noted, it was nothing less than the attempt by those Kazakhs who were Russian subjects to escape Ili at the end of 1870 that would become the direct trigger of the Ili Crisis. Some 1,000 households successfully got away, but the desertion of a Kazakh township headman named Tazabek^{xxxiv} and the refusal by the sultan to hand over any Kazakhs resulted in the dispatch of border guards by Semirech’e Governor-General Kolpakovsky.

In *Xinjiang Jianshi*—a work that may be considered as presenting the official Chinese view—the narrative presents Tazabek as someone who had been loyal to the Qing regime from the start and gives the impression of unlawful incursions by Russia, even though it relies on the account in Terent’ev’s *A History of the Conquest of Central Asia*. However, Kolpakovsky sees the root cause of Tazabek’s flight to Ili as lying in his not having been selected under Russian rule as township headman after 1871 [Kolpakovskii 1872: 218]; also, since there are records showing he worked with the Russian side, I would tend to think from this that he did indeed have Russian citizenship.^{xxxv}

3.2. The Presence of Kazakhs around Ili

The Kazakhs had lands they roamed through in the outskirts of Ili, as the fact that Tazabek's move helped trigger the Ili Crisis makes plain. Starting in the mid-18th century when the Kazakhs entered into a formal relationship with the Qing court, Kazakhs—particularly from the clans of the Senior Zhuz—would visit Ili for trade purposes and move to inside the *karun* borders of the Qing to escape the cold winds of winter.^{xxxvi} The power holders in Kazakh society (called the sultan or the *tore*) came from the Kazakh khan's family, who were descendents of Chinggis Khan; Sultan Tezek^{xxxvii} held power in the Senior Zhuz at this particular time.

Before the Taranchis established their power in Ili, Sultan Tezek was notified that that Tugalak, who was the *Shan beg* (the term indicates a person of authority in Taranchi society) of Ili,^{xxxviii} had sent a letter to Russia (October 4, 1866) [TsGA RK, f. 3, op. 1, d. 372, l. 8ob.]. Aristov writes that Tugalak sent the letter to Russian troops deployed in Chunji asking why they had been stationed there but was not able to get an answer [Aristov 2003a: 284].

In September 1868, the Taranchis sent word through Tezek that rumors that the Taranchis' army was going to attempt an attack on Vernyi (present day Almaty) were falsehoods, and that they desired friendly relations with Russia [Aristov 2003a: 284-85]. As to subsequent negotiations between Russia and Ili via the Kazakhs, though other substantive archival materials are believed to exist I have not yet been able to track them down.

As the next section will show, negotiations between the Taranchi regime and Russia did not go well and wound up turning into an excuse for the Russian army to invade Ili.

3.3. Relations between the Taranchis Regime and Russia

The *Huimin* Muslims in Ili tried to make contact with the Russian authorities but the attempt ended in failure.^{xxxix} Two letters were also sent from the Sultan to Russia [Aristov 2003a: 285], but the envoy was waylaid by Kazakhs of Russian nationality. Dissatisfaction on both sides mounted thanks to unsuccessful exchanges of this sort; finally, Kaul'bars^{xl} was dispatched from Vernyi to Ili near the end of 1870, but this intercession likewise failed [Moiseev 2006: 71].

An American traveler, Schuyler (1840-90), who entered Ili by way of Central Asia in 1873 wrote the following about relations between the Sultanate and Russia after the Ili Crisis:

“[Turkestan Governor-] General Kaufmann had begun to think that the existence of this little principality could no longer be allowed; fears were expressed that it would fall into the hands of Yakub Bek of Kashgar, who was then making great progress in his war against the Dungans of Urumtsi and Turfan. It was for this reason that the Muzart Pass was occupied [by Russia] [Schuyler 1876: 186]

Schuyler saw the Russian army as having masterminded the Ili Crisis in order to curb the Yaqub-bek regime in Kashgar. Furthermore, in addition to curbing Kashgar, there is also information to the effect Kaufman had advised the Russian government on the necessity of driving out British forces [Rostovsky 1942: 159].

However, as the text record makes clear, Kaufman's report to Minister of War Miliutin spoke of occupying Ili in order to restore it to the Qing and as a means of *reviving slumped trade* [Voskresenskii 1995: 80; emphasis added]. Similarly, with Foreign Minister Gorchakov, Kaufman spoke of

occupying Ili to revive slumped trade (1870) [Gurevich 1982: 436]. Nonetheless, there were repeated indications that the central government was not open to Kaufman's line and that the invasion of Ili was ordered so as to create a *fait accompli*.^{xli}

In fact, at a meeting held April 20, 1871, the central government of the Russian Empire decided it would no longer maintain its non-interventionist stance. Kaufman and the governors-general of Semipalatinsk and Semirech'e stubbornly insisted that neutrality in Eastern Turkestan affairs could no longer continue. This led to the convening of a special committee (*soveshchanie*) in Petersburg on April 20 chaired by Miliutin and attended by representatives of the governors-general of Turkestan and Western Siberia. It was decided at the meeting that Russia would no longer restrict itself to "non-engagement regarding various incidents that occur in neighboring countries." In fact, "due to the harm of all sorts that such events have had on our political designs and trade for seven years, our immediate intervention into matters in western China has become unavoidable."^{xlii}

Looking at the impact on the Kashgar regime more closely, we see that an emissary of Borodin who was dispatched to Ili in 1870^{xliii} had been in contact with an emissary Yaqub-bek dispatched to Ili, and the Russian side also knew that contact between Yaqub-bek and the Taranchis was taking on a touch of real possibility. Furthermore, Borodin's negotiations with the Sultanate at this time on trade were not meeting with any success [Gurevich 1982: 434]. This resulted in Kolpakovsky sending a report to Kaufman in May 1871 regarding interference and the threat presented by Yaqub-bek [Gurevich 1982: 439].

3.4. Russia's Aims and Contemporary International Relations

Previous scholars have already pointed out several factors behind Russia's occupation of Ili in examining the background to the Ili Crisis from a broad perspective. These include (1) the Anglo-Russian rivalry, (2) the Yaqub-bek regime, (3) concerns over the growth of the Muslim forces of the Taranchis, (4) border problems between Russia and the Qing, and (5) protecting trade [Liu 1981: 36-37].

Let us first consider relations between Russia and Britain (1), in between whom the Yaqub-bek regime (2) that held power in neighboring Kashgaria (western Xinjiang) after 1864^{xliv} found itself sandwiched. It is well known that Russia (particularly the Governor-General of Turkestan) held negotiations with the Yaqub-bek regime, and Yaqub-bek's envoy, Shadi made his way in 1868 to Petersburg.^{xlv}

Meanwhile, the British had surmised that Russia had aims to make a connection with Yaqub-bek;^{xlvi} furthermore, in order to build ties in their own right with the ruler, R. Shaw visited Yaqub-bek in 1868 in the guise of a merchant while Forsyth was sent to Kashgar in 1870 and again in 1873.

The Russians, too, were unmistakably worried about the British allying with the Yaqub-bek regime, as records at the Central State Archives of Kazakhstan (TsGA RK) show. Word also reached Russia that Yaqub-bek had tried to entice the Tungans in Ili to join the British ranks.^{xlvii} Yaqub-bek originally had been a soldier in the Khanate of Kokand and fought against Russia's conquering army, but later he was sent to Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang). He took advantage of the Muslim rebellion against the Qing raging in this area to solidify his own power and with that power he was able to drive the Qing out.

Hsu (Xu Zhongyue), who analyzed the Ili Crisis and subsequent Russo-Qing negotiations, wrote the following about Yaqub-bek: "The rise of Yakub Beg posed a difficult problem for the Russian

government. Here was a man who was anti-Russian—having registered the Russian conquest of Khokand a few earlier—and who now had established himself in Sinkiang. His new Moslem state on Chinese soil might become a rallying-point for the discontented elements in the Central Asian khanates that had lately come under Russian rule. It was even possible that with British blessing his kingdom might ultimately develop into a large Central Asian Moslem empire aspiring to include Russian Turkestan. Thus considered, Yakub Beg was *a threat to Russia*, and an instrument of Britain” (emphasis added here and below) [Hsu 1965: 29]. Kim Hodong likewise indicates Russia’s concerns included the notion of the two Muslim regimes in Ili and Kashgar drawing closer and the notion of British influence extending to Jungharia [Kim 2004: 140-141].

Many researchers are thus of the view as the foregoing has shown that the Russian occupation of Ili was meant to check the expansion of Yaqub-bek’s power, and furthermore to remove the British influence that lay behind it. We may conclude at the very least as Terent’ev suggests that Russia “could not permit a powerful Muslim kingdom that held the Muzart Pass^{xlviii} to establish itself next to Russia or see Ili occupied by Yaqub-bek” [Terent’ev 1875: 129].

One may safely say that interpretations such as this one that are based around the Great Game between Britain and Russia are shared by many. However, this image of a rivalry between the two powers also appears to have been particularly emphasized in documents—numerous examples of which have already been presented—written after the Ili Crisis.^{xlix} It is not entirely clear just how self-conscious the antipathy toward Britain, the backer of the Yaqub-bek regime, was in Russia at the time. Russia sent Kaul’bars in 1872 to conclude commercial treaty with the Kashgar regime, but Britain is thought to have also regarded this as important because through this treaty Russia recognized the independence of the Yaqub-bek regime [Rawlinson 1875: 332-333].

One must also note the fact that Soviet-era accounts naturally justified Russia’s actions and celebrated resistance to British imperialism.^l Gurevich, who has also studied the Ili Crisis from the perspective of the history of international relations, saw the occupation as an emergency and temporary development, and endeavored to present the position that Russia had worked to return the region [Gurevich 1982: 441]. As to the ambiguities in Russian perceptions of Britain and the differences of opinion between the center and the provinces (Turkestan and Semirech’e) that are the topic of this section, a close examination of the written record does seem to reveal facts at odds with the conventional narrative. However, I will limit myself as much as possible in this article to simply suggesting the possibilities and proceed with my investigations at the micro-level.^{li}

Russian documents as already noted suggest that Russia embarked on its occupation of the Ili region with the goal of restoring trade. Skachkov further stresses that the new treaty of 1881 on the return of Ili made possible trading by surface routes through Xinjiang,^{lii} but surely might we see this as having been Russia’s main objective. That is to say, Russia had expectations about Ili’s role in serving as a portal for exchanging goods with the Qing. The fact that there was activity (1872) in hopes that merchants would be dispatched to Barkol immediately after the Ili Crisis also serves as corroboration of the Russian obsession with trade in northwestern China.^{liii}

Terent’ev writes, “If we [Russia] had not intervened, the luxuriant [*plodorodny*] Ili River basin and its good climate might have fallen into the hands of the Tungans or Yakub-bek,” [Terent’ev 1875: 130]. This includes the possibility that Russia also had territorial ambitions. In an account similar to the reasons offered publicly at the time, Pantusov assigned responsibility to the Sultanate:

The reasons [for the occupation of Ili] were . . . the Ili regime’s intolerable acts of hostility that finally went beyond the limits of endurance, the pressure it put on our trade, and

its acceptance of plundering by its subjects in areas along our frontier [Pantusov 1881: 1].

Furthermore, while the planned return of Ili to the Qing may have provided the justification, it is not the case that Russian occupation absolutely did not imagine the possibility of the Ili region reverting Russia. This may be understood from Pantusov's introduction, where he states: "The problems of Russian rule . . . thirdly, should the Ili valley become part of the territory of the Russian Empire, how to establish equality and balance among the various peoples of the region in a way that is not without benefit to the Russian government [Pantusov 1881: 1]."

Whatever the case, tensions between the Sultanate of Ili and Russia heightened in 1871, the Taranchis attacked the Russian guard post at Boro-khotszir, and as a result hostilities commenced [Schuyler 1876: 186]. The Russian army captured the Muzart Pass and advanced into Ili. On June 22 (according the "Old Style" Julian calendar then used in Russia, hereafter O.S.), the sultan surrendered and the Ili region entered a brief period of Russian rule.^{liv}

What's more, there are also indications that the Russian army was prepared to take on Urumqi as well.^{lv} Gaining control of Ili and Urumqi had not been anticipated at the stage when decisions were first being made in the Russian government [Semenov 1910: XLII]. Accordingly, although invading by way two routes through West Siberia and Semirech'e had been envisioned, as Babkov (an official in West Siberia, a territory not under Turkestan's jurisdiction) notes the governors-general of Turkestan and West Siberia did not try to cooperate [Babkov 1912: 527].

Thus, shedding light from a more micro-level perspective on the process that led up to the Ili Crisis reveals that more attention must be directed to Russo-Qing trade and also the productivity of the Ili region itself as background to the crisis. In the next section, I will more sharply focus my analysis on these two points in regards to Ili's Russian period.

4. The Local Characteristics of Russian Rule after Establishment of the "Ili Region"

4.1. Prior to Russian Occupation

The plentiful water resources represented by the Ili River are what come to mind when we consider what makes the region so bountiful. This waterway is a major river that begins from its three major tributaries—the Kash, Tekes, and Kunges—and joins them mainly with water coming from the melting snows of Tian Shan, flowing eventually into Lake Balkhash.^{lvi} The Ili region under Qing rule had already seen been attempts to use the river for reclamation and irrigation projects.

It is known, as Saguchi has shown, that the Taranchis population rose from 6,000 to 8,000 households in the 1830s^{lvii} and new lands were opened as a consequence [Saguchi 1986: 266]. On this point, Radloff indicates that taxes for the 8,000 households from 1834 onward totaled 256,000 *cho* (*hu* 斛), more than 2,000,000 rubles.^{lviii} That amounts to 128,000 *shi*, and hence the ratio of 16 *shi* per household apparently had not changed.

Regarding reclamation, Radloff first makes mention of a channel-opening project at Tokus Tara. He explained its origins based perhaps on oral accounts, and then pointed out a statement the Hakim and others made in response to an inquiry from a general: "It would be possible to get water from the Ili if a great canal were made to flow from the river in the outskirts at a place near Tokus Tara."^{lix} Referring to another document, Radloff noted: "When arable land was parceled out to the new Taranchis clans, the building of a new waterway at Tokus Tara was ordered in 1834 in order to collect legal taxes from them as well. It was built in the space of two years, running south from the Ili River" [Radloff 1893: 333]. Continuing, Radloff said the Taranchis in Boroburgasun and Bilākāi

laid on a new waterway at their own expense. However, since the Tokus Tara waterway did not provide a sufficient volume of water, they were unable to collect taxes from 1,500 households for three years starting in 1836.

In another project whose relationship with the foregoing projects is unclear, water was taken from one of the Ili tributaries, the Kash River, in years 18-24 of the Daoguang era (1838-44) [Hua 1998: 174]. New lands were opened with settlements for Taranchis, including *Tashitubi* (塔什图畢, Taštubi) with 100 households, *Sandaowan* (三道灣) with 500,^{lx} and *Alebusi* (阿勒卜斯) with 500 [Saguchi 1986: 264-265; Hua 1998: 177]. While the number of *mu* of land initially allotted to the 6,000 households Saguchi speaks of is not known,^{lxi} 16,000 *shi* were paid annually on the 164,750 *mu* (畝) at the time it was newly reclaimed. Furthermore, 16,000 *shi* was also paid annually on 256,493 *mu* of land when Sandaowan and Alebusi were opened [*Yijiang Jizai*: 105].

Taxes were also collected from the Taranchis on these lands; based on what we can tell from a report to the Emperor titled *Yili zouzhe* (伊犁奏摺, Ili Memorial) regarding the levy of Xianfeng 6 (1856) indicating taxes “to be collected from the Muslims of Ili total 25,000 *shi* of barley, 25,000 *shi* of wheat, and 50,000 *shi* of foxtail millet . . . [and] to be collected from the Muslims in such places as the newly reclaimed land of Taštubi total 24,000 *shi* of grains,” there is a good chance we can determine even more precise tax amounts from such documents.^{lxii}

Thus the waters obtained from the river including through the aforementioned waterway development are connected with the rich productive capacity of the Ili region. Let us next consider the products these lands actually produced. Saguchi as we have seen has provided detailed information about the Taranchis regarding the situation through the mid-19th century. For the subsequent period this article relies on statistical materials from the Imperial Russian authorities. These documents were compiled by N. Pantusov (1849-1909) and cover three periods: the years prior to Russian occupation, 1873, and 1876-77. Pantusov was also a scholar of East Asia and is best known for having compiled documents written in Central Asian languages,^{lxiii} but at the time he worked in the Ili region secretariat under the Russian government. Pantusov described the natural environment of the Ili region as follows:

The dryness of the soil and the air throughout the valley makes the watering of farmland the indispensable condition for agriculture. That depends on irrigation, and the river that flows from the mountains provides every convenience for constructing such. In addition, there are irrigation canals. [Pantusov 1881: 14]

The need for irrigation and reclamation projects noted above may be seen here as well.

Next we look at the Ili region during the era of the sultanate (*Sultanstvo*) that directly preceded the Russian occupation. Pantusov presents information regarding how many people made up the ruling “*beg*” class; how many people were in each settlement under the *mullah*, or Islamic leaders, and the *Zakat*^{lxiv} from merchants; here, however, let us examine how much tax was collected from Kazakhs on sheep and how much grain was levied (see **Table 1**).

Kyzai clan	617 head	
Suwan clan	966 head	
Atban clan	1,571 head	
Collections for prayers	104 head	Total: 3,258 head

Table 1: Zakat on Sheep from Kazakhs, 1869-70 [Pantusov 1876a: 202]

The statistics showing the taxes collected from the Kazakhs show that the burden they paid for domestic animals was a heavy one compared to what they had previously paid on tributary horses.^{lxv}

Next, grain levy statistics for those settlements where mainly Taranchis appear to have lived are shown on **Table 2** on the following page. Locations that share the name of one-time Taranchis settlements account for most of it.

Taranchi settlements on <i>Xinjiang shilue</i> , vol. 6 [Saguchi 1986: 262] ^{lxvi} (units: <i>hu</i> 戶, households)	Radloff's records [Radloff 1893: 331-332] (units: household)	Settlements of the Sultanate	Barley	Wheat	Oil (Ru. <i>maslo</i>)
達爾達木圖: 500 (added in 1794)	Dolaty, Galdshang, Dadamty: 600	Village (<i>Kent</i>) of Dardamtu	263	610	
		<i>Sotnia</i> ^{lxvii} (possibly, of Dardamtu)	220½	631	
霍諾海: 800	Chonokai: 400	Khonokhai	964½	2,081½	
		<i>Sotnia</i> of Gulja	1,000	1,576	50
(founded in the <i>Daoguan</i> era)		<i>Sotnia</i> of Toguz-tara	501	1,130	
巴爾托海: 600	Along the canal, Baitukai: 500	Bartokai	263½	271	42
塔什圖畢 (founded in the <i>Daoguan</i> time: 100)		Tash-tiube	267	326½	106½
塔什鄂斯坦: 400		Tash-usten [?]	335	434½	119½
喀什: 500	On the other bank of Kasch River: 500	Kash	332	412	138
阿勒卜斯 (founded in the <i>Daoguan</i> era: 500)		Araboz	445	776	
博羅布爾噶蘇: 1100	Boroburgasun, Bilākāi, Tschulburkai: 500	Borbogusun	507	801½	293½
呢勒哈 (founded in Jiaqing 9 (1804))	Riverbank of Nilka: 400	Nilkhi	129	198	34
鄂羅斯坦: 600	Along the canal, Ari Östäng: 600	Arustan	206	447	96
海弩克: 600	Kainak: 200	Koinak	370	593	157
三道灣 (founded in the <i>Daoguan</i> era: 500)		/			
	On the right bank of Ili River Olatai: 600				
濟爾噶朗: 900	Jirgalang 1000 戶				
	On the left bank of Ili River, Tarksyl: 100, Koguschi: 200, Jagystai: 200, Bugra: 200				
Total			5,776½	10,288	1,036½
Collected in 1870 from the harvest of grain or collected for state-owned land use [Pantusov1876a: 203]			6,069½ <i>Tagara</i>	10,081 <i>Tagara</i>	

Table 2: Levies of Wheat and Oil by the Sultanate of Ili (1869-70)^{lxviii}

Under the old system, the rule was to collect four *shi* of each type of grain from each household for a total of 16 *shi*; the amount of taxes actually collected also corresponded to this [Hua 1998: 177]. Fedorov writes that of those Taranchis who migrated to Ili during the Qing era, 100 families (*Sotnia* in Russian or *Yuz* in Turkic) were given 1,000 to 2,000 *kho* of land^{lxix} while one household in keeping with the quality of the land was given from 15 to 30 *kho* (60 to 120 *mu*) from the *Yuz beg* (“100-household chief”); as compensation, the Qing government was paid 30 *kho*^{lxx} of grain (one


kho = three *pood*, 30 *funt* [61.425 kg] [Fedorov 1903: 34-35] for each household. Two types of *kho* appear here. The *kho* that expresses a unit of area is approximately the same size as the *khu* Kaul'bars mentions: "One *khu* is one lot (*uchastok*), and it is possible to grow three *pood* of seeds there. Two *khu* corresponds to one *chetvert*"^{lxxxi} [Kaul'bars 1874: 147]. Originally, *kho* was a unit of mass that meant "measuring container," but as the above examples show it also indicated the area of land needed to sow the same amount of grain, and furthermore may also have expressed weight.

Elsewhere, Pantusov discusses the *kho* of the period in the following manner: "The *kho* of the Taranchis equals 100 Chinese *dzhin*; 1 *dzhin* is equal to 1½ Russian *funt*."^{lxxii} The *kho* of the Sibe was around 65 to 70 Chinese *dzhin*" [Pantusov 1881: 14, footnote]. There is also data to the effect that each household of Taranchis of Ili made offerings of 16 *tagar* (bags)^{lxxiii} of barley, wheat, common millet, and foxtail millet [Saguchi 1986: 278]. If the *kho* used to show units of barley and wheat on Table 2 is the same size as the *kho* of the Taranchis noted above, then the 5,776.5 bags of barley and 10,288 bags of wheat would amount to 346,590 kg and 617,280 kg, respectively. While a simple comparison in terms of weight cannot be done, we can see that the amount of taxes collected had fallen if we compare this to the 128,000 *shi* in taxes paid under the old system.^{lxxiv} It is hard to imagine that agriculture in this region, which is thought to have been left in considerable ruin in the wake of the Muslim uprising, would have recovered in 1869-70. Pantusov also points out that little work had been done to tend to and harvest the crops in this district in 1871. People had few opportunities to take up farm work that year as their time was being consumed with being recruited into the sultan's army for military service in the fight with Russia [Pantusov 1881: 13]. Consequently, agricultural recovery in fact must be seen as something that took place at a later date.

4.2. The Period of Russian Rule

Following its occupation, Russia established a special secretariat that was to carry out the Semi-rech'e military governor's orders in the Ili region. The region was divided into several districts. There were four districts at first, but District 3 was done away with in 1874 and its land consolidated with District 1. In 1876, District 4 was abolished, resulting in 2 districts north and south of each other [Pantusov 1881: 2].^{lxxv}

Turning to the Qing's views of Ili during the Russian era, we find first a memorial to the emperor in *Chouban yiwu shimo* (籌辦夷務始末) observing that it had been split into four areas: Ghulja (固爾扎城), Boroburgasun (博羅布爾噶蘇), Kainak (海努克), and Suiding (綏定城).^{lxxvi} However, we should note that we cannot learn about such factors as social structure, production, and the like from the Qing archival materials that have come to light so far. Also, the territory that Russia occupied, including those places that until then had been considered Qing territory—specifically, those areas ceded to Russia under the Treaty of Saint Petersburg such as Dzharkent, the zone with hatched lines on **Map 3** between Boro-khotszir and Khorgos—does not completely correspond with the "Ili district" in today's



Map 3: Occupation of "Ili district" by Russia
(Source: Hsu [1965: 186])

China. The situation after the area was finally split into two districts north and south of each other was as follows.

First, based on statistics from 1876 the population included 51,819 Taranchis; 33,828 Kazakhs; 18,318 Sibe; 4,031 Tungans; 2,847 Han Chinese; 15,940 Oyirads (*Kalmyk*), and Torghuts; and 767 Solon; the totals were 82,142 settled people and 49,786 nomads [Pantusov 1881: 9]. Compare this to figures from an earlier point in time: “[T]he Manchurian and Mongol garrison force at *Huiyuan* City totals 4,368 households with 18,369 people. The Manchurian and Mongol force at *Yining* City totals 2,216 households with 8,723 people. The Sibe force number 1,018 households and 4,439 people. Solon forces number 1,018 households and 3,268 people. The Chahar Mongol garrison numbers 1,836 households and 5,548 people. The Oyirad force number roughly 3,516 households and 10,737 people. *Huizi* [Taranchis] number 6,406 households and 20,556 people.” Provided we exclude those Manchurian and Mongol force, Solons, Chahar Mongols, and Oyirads who had fled due to the Muslim Rebellion, the figures show the population was growing.^{lxxvii}

From the taxation units recorded for each separate population group (1876) we can work out how much each settlement had developed [Pantusov 1881: 142-144].

North District	<u>Taranchis</u>	Ghulja City (1,367 households); Mazar Village (52 households); outskirts (10 <i>sotnia</i>); Tokuz-Tara (10 <i>sotnia</i> ; Araboz (6 <i>sotnia</i>); Borobogosun (5 <i>sotnia</i>); Bartokhai (8 <i>sotnia</i>); Tashustan (7 <i>sotnia</i>); Arustan (10 <i>sotnia</i>); Kash township (553 households); Mazar Nilki township (421 households)
	<u>Kazakhs</u>	Suvan clan (<i>volost'</i> , 1,903 households); Baidzhigit clan (1,213 households); Kyzai clan (1,598 households)
	<u>Central Asian merchants</u>	649 households (residing in Ghulja)
	<u>Tungans</u>	Suidun and Chinchakhodzi (1,151 households); Ghulja City (159 households)
	<u>Han Chinese</u>	Luutsugun City (327 households); Chimpandzi City (111 households); Ghulja City (628 households)
	<u>Solon</u>	Akkent and Dzarkent villages (147 households)
	<u>Kalmyks</u>	(Orirad) Arbun-Sumun (1,429 households)
Total		17,826 households
South District	<u>Taranchis</u>	Kainak township (1,170 households); Khanakhai township (1,197 households); Ketmen township (number of households unclear)
	<u>Kazakhs</u>	Konurburak township (867 households); Segizsar township (980 households); Aitbozum township (947 households)
	<u>Torghuts</u>	(those under the jurisdiction of <i>gong</i>) 1,645 households
	<u>Kalmyks</u>	Diurbun-Sumun (600 households); Zorgan-Sumun (78 households)
	<u>Sibe</u>	8 niru ^{lxxviii} (2,449 households)
Total		9,933 households

These materials make it possible to draw comparisons with the original Taranchi settlements.

The original total for the two districts of 27,759 households had risen by 1877 to 29,794.

The 1877 population figures for the North District may be broken down for each settlement as follows [Pantusov 1881: 152].

*Ghulja City	Russians: 55 households; merchants: 675 households; Han Chinese: 608 households; Tungans: 160 households; Taranchis: 1,312 households Total population: 9,413
*Ghulja township (<i>volost'</i>)	4 <i>kent</i> ^{lxxix} , 436 households
* Yuz township in the outskirts (<i>podgorodnykh soten</i>)	10 <i>kent</i> , 1,941 households
*Tashustan township	7 <i>kent</i> , 668 households
*Bartukhai township	8 <i>kent</i> , 736 households
*Borobogosun township	6 <i>kent</i> , 552 households
*Arustan township	10 <i>kent</i> , 1,309 households
*Kash township	5 <i>kent</i> , 554 households
*Arboz township	6 <i>kent</i> , 462 households
*Mazar-Nilki	5 <i>kent</i> , 424 households
*Tuguztara	10 <i>kent</i> , 728 households
*Suidun township, where mainly Han Chinese dwelled	Suidun City, Chimbandzi City, Tardzhi Village, Luutsugun City, Chimbandzi Village, Mazar Village Total: 1,727 households
*Solons	3 villages, 147 households

In sum, the district's populace included 46,604 settled people (24,948 men, 21,656 women) in 12,494 households. Locations where nomads resided in the North District included Suvan *volost'* with 2,162 households, Kyzai *volost'* with 1,610, Baizdhi[gi]t *volost'* with 1,409, Arbun-sumun (Oyirad) with 1,430, and Chakar Kalmyks (Chahar) with 300 [Pantusov 1881: 149]. Taranchi accounted for 38,729 people among the 12,500 households of the North District in 1877.

Settled residents in the South District at this time lived in the townships of Kainak, Khanokhai, and Ketmen, as well as Sibe in 8 *niru* (2,428 households); the totals stood at 5,311 households and 31,864 people, with Taranchi accounting for 2,784 households and 13,543 people. Nomads were to be found in Aitbozum township in 1,089 households, Konurburk township in 925 households, Segizsar township in 1,038 households, Diurbun-Sumun in 622 households (with grazing land in Tokuz tara), and Torghut (6 *aul*^{lxxx}) in 1,725 households for a total of 5,399 households and 24,857 people [Pantusov 1881: 148-149]. Settlements of nomads in the South District in 1877 aside from those noted above included those in Kainak township (9 *aul*, 1,168 households), Khanokhai township (12 *aul*, 1,197 households), and Oyirads living in Zurgan-sumun (78 households) [Pantusov 1881: 156].

If we consider trends in the Taranchi population as one example, then it is clear that the figure had doubled from the earlier noted 6,406 households and 20,556 people to the 1877 numbers showing 11,906 households and 52,272 people.

Next is productive capacity. **Table 3** (see below) shows the quantities of seeds sown and harvest volumes for three districts in the Ili region in 1873.

Since the size of only those areas being farmed by the Taranchis cannot be established, our in-

formation covers the whole of the Ili region. The approximate harvest to seed ratio for common millet stood at 45:1 in No. 1 District, 30:1 in No. 2 District, and 39:1 in No. 3 District for the Taranchis. With respect to spring wheat the respective figures were 17:1, 30:1, and 16:1, and for barley 14:1, 30:1, and 16:1. Of the main four grains, it was Han Chinese and Tungans^{lxxxii} who did most of the rice cultivation (because it was basically farmed in Ghulja City and Suiding township, where those groups lived) [Pantusov 1881: 147].

	Winter wheat	Millet	Spring wheat	Barley	Rice	Others	Potatoes	
No. 1 District	(seeding)	241	5,079	2,984	1,175	1,185	25	
	(harvest)	10,845	86,343	41,776	23,500	14,220	250	
No. 2 District		620	9,341	6,062	47	482		
		18,600	280,230	18,1860	2,350	3,589		
No.3 District (top numbers indicate seed volume, bottom number indicate harvest volume)	Sibe	58	71	3,995	42	716	1,781	
	No reference		341	37,304	296	10,877	30,898	
	Taranchi		71	24	2,892	1,275		226
		No reference		948	46,024	20,466		5,365
	Kazakh			130	416			
				3,919	5,848			
	Oyirad			87	483	50		72
				2,120	5,716	528		1,350

Table 3: Statistics from 1873 [Pantusov 1876b: 166-167]^{lxxxii}

Pantusov wrote the following regarding production in the Ili region (North District).

Agriculture developed after [the occupation of Ili in 1871]. According to data from 1876, 110 *chetvert'* [hereafter *ch.*] of winter wheat, 68,666 *ch.* of spring grains (mainly wheat, followed by barley, rice, and finally common millet) and 256 *ch.* of potatoes were planted, resulting in a harvest of 1,034,873 *ch.* of spring grains, 864 *ch.* of winter wheat, and 2,478 *ch.* of potatoes. The harvest ratio for spring grains stood at 15-fold, for the winter grains 8-fold, and for potatoes 9-fold; this works out to 7 or 8 *ch.* of cereal grass per person [Pantusov 1881: 13-14].

Looking for example at the five “one-hundred households” in the North District, township of Kash, we see the Taranchis in 554 households with 2,290 people planted 13,560 *pood* (Ru. *pud*, 1 *pood* = 16.38 kg) of wheat, 4,452 *pood* of barley, and 360 *pood* of common millet, resulting in harvests from each respective grain of 871,300 *pood*, 45,500 *pood*, and 10,860 *pood*. The harvest volumes clearly stood at 64:1, 10:1, and 30:1, respectively, considerably raising the average amount [Pantusov 1881: 147].

Next I present details from the statistical materials of 1876 that Pantusov summarized. Kaul'bars took special note of the rich natural environment of the Ili valley and referred to the higher productivity of the northern areas [Kaul'bars 1874: 133], which is consistent with the conditions reported on **Tables 4 and 5**. However, there appears to have been frost damage in 1876: "In the South district, 561 *kho* of wheat planted by the Sibe and 731 *kho* by the Taranchis was completely destroyed by hail, preventing a larger harvest. For the Taranchis, the same situation also prevailed for 200 *kho* of barley plantings" [Pantusov 1881: 14, footnote]. The harvest ratio for 1877 in the South District improved for this reason.

	Winter wheat	Millet	Spring wheat	Oak	Barley	Rice	Other Spring grain	Potatoes
North District seeding	110	2,871	25,180	80	7,850	1,968	2,866	256
harvest	864	100,842	455,418	742	118,112	37,158	40,075	2,478
South District seeding		812 $\frac{1}{8}$	19,407		1,768 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,581	4,282 $\frac{1}{2}$	
harvest		18,264	161,390 $\frac{1}{2}$		29,503	13,541	59,828	

Table 4: Agricultural Production in 1876 [Pantusov 1881: 122-123] (units = *chetvert*)

	Winter wheat	Millet	Spring wheat	Oak	Barley	Rice	Other Spring grain	Potatoes
North District seeding		2,821 $\frac{1}{2}$	18,781	150	5,940	1,842 $\frac{1}{2}$	3,126	328
harvest		118,522	484,387 $\frac{1}{2}$	2280	77,676 $\frac{1}{2}$	36,878	40,638	3,280
South District seeding		830	20,100		2,870	1,582	4,283	
harvest		38,700	241,200		34,440	15,820	55,689	

Table 5 : Agricultural Production in 1877 [Pantusov 1881: 180-183] (units = *chetvert*)

The data needed to investigate the original productivity of the land regarding the area under cultivation and agricultural technology (farming implements and methods) used at that time could not be obtained. Also, it is difficult to make the most of the statistical materials introduced here. Consequently, our focus in this article is on presenting a broad outline of the production situation in the Ili region.^{lxxxiii}

The following data have been obtained with reference to livestock farming. The statistics for 1876 show that livestock owned in both the north and south districts plus Ghulja all told included 78,357 horses, 60,217 domesticated horned animals, 543,954 sheep, and 53,968 goats, adding up to 748,254 animals [Pantusov 1881: 121]. Cows and sheep were exported to Russia in later years [Hino 1973 v. 2: 138]. Modern statistics for the whole of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture show there were 3.06 million head of livestock in 1949 and 12.31 million in 1998, with wool sheep accounting for 70 percent of the total [Zizhizhou zhi: 443-444].

The Russian authorities imposed a poll tax (*podat'*) of 3 rubles on each household on this agriculture and livestock, collecting 70,000 to 80,000 rubles every year. A local tax (*zemskii sbor*) was introduced separately starting in 1874 [Pantusov 1881: 35]. This was for the troops who were stationed in the Ili region; the amount was about 20 percent that of the poll tax.^{lxxxiv} To judge how much of a burden these taxes were, note first the nine townships in the Northern District where the Taranchis lived in 1877 had 7,345 households with 30,774 people. That year, they planted 108,384 *pood* of wheat with a crop of 3,410,140 *pood* (30-fold); 34,015 *pood* of barley yielded a harvest of 452,473 *pood* (13-fold); and 8,688 *pood* of common millet produced a crop of 358,466 *pood* (41-fold). Dividing the total harvest volume of 4,221,079 *pood* by the number of households, the ratio works out to 574 *pood* (9,402 kg) of grain per household [Pantusov 1881: 147]. Estimating from contemporary price lists for grain,^{lxxxv} it seems safe to say that the tax burden had declined substantially since the 3.6 ruble burden on each 1 household corresponded to no more than 3 *chetvert'* or around 6 *shi* and furthermore the harvest volumes themselves had also risen.

Turning to trade, a particular obsession of Russia in its relations with Xinjiang, the total value of imports to Ili in 1873 stood at 210,819 rubles, with fabrics (*Daba*) in particular accounting for around half. Inferring from 1875 statistics, much of this was Kashgar-made Muslim cloth (*huibu*), and they show that as had been the case prior to the Muslim Rebellion it was necessary to redirect it in order to satisfy demand in Ili and surrounding areas. Exports for 1873 totaled 240,655 rubles. The items that accounted for particularly large transaction volumes included cotton goods (*Bumazhnye tovary*), cotton goods from the area, grains, wheat and other agricultural products, silver ingots (*yuanbao*), and livestock [Pantusov 1876b: 168-171].

Trade data for 1875 shows imports totaled 440,207 rubles, for a transaction volume roughly double that of 1873 [Pantusov 1881: 93]. Information regarding which goods were obtained from which city is recorded in the statistics for this year. Special note should be made of the data on textile goods, which show that the amount coming from Irbit, one of Russia's three great seasonal markets, had risen to 61,100 rubles. This shows that the Ili region had, in short, become a market for goods from domestic Russian factories. As noted earlier, cotton fabrics from Kashgar accounted for most of that type of good. The total value of exports for this year was 240,167 rubles. A unique feature here is the fact that many items were diverted for consumption in both districts of the Ili region [Pantusov 1881: 96-97]. The total value of imports for 1876 amounted to 389,740 rubles and exports stood at 208,033 rubles.

Given Russia's aims regarding trade, Russia's interest in goods produced in Ili itself should also be given considerations. There are indications that fruits were the main products exported to Russia.^{lxxxvi} We can infer from the statistics that Ili instead played the role of a midway point through which imports from Russia traveled on their way to Jinghe and Tarbagatai.

Finally, I want to look at how residents of Ili at the time saw Russia's occupation of the region. Documents such as a memorandum by a Han Chinese named Liu-Tsun'-khan' who wrote "this incident [the Ili Crisis] was welcomed with joy by all the Han who remained alive" [Grum-Grzhimailo 1896: 15] and the recollections of certain Sibe [Diiakov 1908] suggest that there were many who welcomed Russia's occupation. However, accounts of this sort are seen consistently in the Russian literature; more detailed investigation is required. There is also a study on this period that shows local residents wanted Russian control and, according to a report from Aristov, the Taranchis and Tungans were also satisfied with it [Gurevich 1982: 443].^{lxxxvii} Li Sheng's summation, however, leaves us with the impression that the Russia's rule of Ili overemphasized interventions by Russia into local society [Li 1995: 51-56]. Careful investigation is required.^{lxxxviii} It is certainly the case

that during the Russian era a judicial system was developed and work on developing the infrastructure in Ghulja City took place [Fedorov 1903: 56-58]; this is thought to be the product of Kolpakovsky's experiences in Semirech'e.

As the foregoing illustrates, it is possible to learn about the development of the Ili region at a micro-level during the occupation period from the data collected by Russia.^{lxxxix} Supplementing Fedorov's survey and the work of Li Sheng with Pantusov's statistical materials can help us to see the socio-economic situation from all angles. This also gives us the prospect of drawing comparisons with the preceding and subsequent periods while conducting more detailed research including on taxation amounts particularly with respect to the agricultural economy—the product of using the waters from the Ili and its tributaries—in which the Taranchis were involved. **Map 1** presented above may serve as a reference regarding the scope of land used by each people, including that used for roaming and pasturage. The *Yili Hasake Zizhizhou zhi* (2004) is available for drawing comparisons with conditions after Xinjiang Province was established and with the Yining of today.

5. Matters Learned from Subsequent Russo-Qing Negotiations

5.1. Negotiations with the Qing Dynasty

Russia's rule produced a certain degree of stability in this region as has been seen, but to the Qing the actions of the Russian army meant that their territory was being threatened. Relations between the two powers became tense.

First, the West Siberia Governor-General sent a telegram to Russian Ambassador Vlangali in Beijing notifying him that Ili had been occupied on *Tongzhi* 10.5.17 (O.S. June 22, 1871; Gregorian July 4). He also signaled the Russian government's aims to Office for the management of affairs with all foreign countries (*Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen*, abbreviated to *Zongli Yamen*), which at the time dealt with Qing foreign relations. The contents of his message were fetched to the Zongli Yamen on 7.13 (O.S. August 16).^{xc} The Russian march was expressed as “Ili has been recovered” in a formal report to the emperor regarding Russia's move. The communication from Russia was likewise construed as saying: “Taking seriously the long years of friendliness with your country, our troops were dispatched and they have recovered Ili on behalf of the Qing” [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 82, 9]. In short, as far as the Russian government was concerned, its position was that on behalf of the Qing it had brought under control a Ili region that was in chaos. A directive dated July 30, 1871 (O.S.) that Gorchakov, who held the post of both prime minister and foreign minister, had already sent to Vlangali likewise illustrates the view that Imperial Russia had no intentions of incorporating Ili in its territory and that instead receiving privileges for Russian trade was more important.^{xcii}

The Qing Emperor issued a court letter or secret edict (*Jixin shangyu* 寄信上諭) on 7.25 (O.S. August 28) regarding Russia's occupation of Ili. The report to the emperor (dated 8.8) that Zuo Zongtang sent in response said, “That Ili has been recovered is, all things considered, a matter of taking advantage of a particular moment under conditions in which only the fit survive,” bluntly displaying his wariness of Russia [HYD *Tongzhi* 10.early Aug.: 085-086]. The first report from the scene in Xinjiang was a report of Wenshuo (文碩), the vice-minister of Kobdo, saying “Russia has recovered Ili.”^{xciii} A similar understanding obtains in an imperial secret edict dated the same day that this report to the emperor was received, which uses the expression: “Ili was recovered on our behalf” [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 83, 18]. On the other hand, one also notes the fact that the Qing had planned to draw reinforcements from the northeast in order to recover Ili [HYD *Tongzhi* 10. late

Sept. (1871): 021].

The first report to Britain regarding the Ili Crisis was that from British Ambassador to Russia, Buchanan in St. Petersburg (August 23) [Hsu 1965: 32]. His following report said that the Qing government was dissatisfied with a proposal from Russia to cooperate on restoring civil order in the region after Ili had been occupied.^{xciii} Also, a copy of the *Saint Petersburg Journal* dated August 24 (O.S.) was appended to a separate report to illustrate that the details of the Ili Crisis were already widely known throughout Russia.^{xciv} Thus, we see that Britain collected information through diplomatic channels, but a detailed examination of FO records remains necessary in this regard.

As for the Qing, a local government official (*zhangjing* 章京) was dispatched to Verniy,^{xcv} after which then Ili Military Governor Rongquan (榮全) was sent to Russia to handle negotiations. Rongquan made for Sergiopol (today Ayagoz) by way of Tarbagatai.^{xcvi} There had already been words in the imperial edict to the effect that “The Russians have taken possession of Ili, and Tungans, Taranchis, and Torghuts are trapped”; the unjustness of Russia’s occupation had become evident.^{xcvii}

The negotiations in Sergiopol between Rongquan and Russia’s plenipotentiary finally took place on *Tongzhi* 11.4.13 (O.S. May 7, 1872). The person dispatched from the Russian side to represent the Foreign Ministry was Boguslavsky.

Russia’s policy included five points: (1) explain the situation in the Ili region to Rongquan and expound on the point that the objective of occupying the Ili region was to preserve it for the Qing; (2) communicate to him that the Ili region can first be returned when Qing forces arrive; (3) find out from him what sort of policy the Qing government has in mind for governing the Ili region; (4) make no mention of indemnities for the cost of dispatching troops; and (5) do not touch on the issue of demarcating borders with the Qing that are too Russia’s advantage [Terent’ev 1875: 132-133]. In his later work, *A History of the Conquest of Central Asia*, Terent’ev would append to item (4) a note that read “Instead of seeking indemnities, spell out more generous terms for free trade,” a deeply interesting passage from the perspective of sorting out Russia’s aims [Terent’ev 1906: 56]. In fact, the summary of Boguslavsky’s statement that Rongquan memorialized to his government contains the passage, “Russian merchants wish to go to and trade in Kobdo, *Buluntuohai* (布倫托海), Hami, Barkol, and Kashgar, among other places throughout Xinjiang,” demonstrating that the Russian side had made a request regarding trade.^{xcviii}

According to Voskresensky, who has analyzed this meeting using both Russian documents and the Qing’s “*Chouban yiwu shimo*”, Boguslavsky explained that Russia had occupied Ili to protect its borders and secure an advantage for the Qing in an area where they had been losing sovereignty. He also told them the Ili region could not be returned until the Qing had assembled enough forces to maintain order and promised not to charge those individuals involved in the Muslim Rebellion.^{xcix} The justification for this lay in the impressions Boguslavsky had obtained on site. In his report to the *Kantsler* (chancellor), the war minister, and Turkestan Governor-General Kaufman, he expressed the view that “the Tungans and Taranchis have a fierce hatred toward the Manchurians’ government, and we cannot speak of returning Ili so long as that does not go away.”^{cc}

Consequently, the meeting ended without an agreement being reached on Ili’s reversion; the stage for continuing negotiations then shifted to Beijing [Gurevich 1982: 445]. As to the reversion of people living the Ili region to Russian jurisdiction, there was a report that: “There is a passage among the correspondence from [the Semirech’e governor] in Almaty that reads, ‘Last year Russia sent in troops and recovered Ili. All of the Taranchis have already renewed their allegiance, and the Torghut nomads attached to Ili are also doing the same.’” The Qing appeared to have rushed to re-

cover the Ili region.^{ci} Furthermore, this report to the emperor also demonstrates that the Russians were trying to resolve matters in the negotiations in Beijing, too, by treating Ili's reversion and trade negotiations as a single package.

5.2. The Ili Region Afterward

There was activity from Zuo Zongtang as well; he brought down the regime of Yaqub-bek and the Qing restored their power in Xinjiang. Negotiations subsequently took place between Russia and the Qing. The Treaty of Livadia (1879), which was crafted with terms extremely disadvantageous to the Qing side, was not ratified. This was replaced by the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1881), and in this the Ili region—though without the lands west of Khorgos^{cii}—was returned to the Qing. The Ili Military Governor entered Suiding City and Russia's occupation army in all probability pulled out after 1882.

Articles in *TS* can tell us more about the debate in Russia over whether or not the Ili region should be returned. For example, an article titled, "Should Ili [*Kul'dzha*] Be Returned to China?" (1878), while reviewing on the pages of a Russian periodical the pros and cons^{ciii} of returning the Ili region also looks at the benefits should it be joined with Russia and conditions in case it was to be returned.^{civ} Numerous other studies were written around that time and may be of value for reinvestigating the Russian Empire's Central Asia policies.

Closing Remarks

While we confined ourselves in this article to raising various questions and problems regarding the process that led up to the Ili Crisis that was examined in the first part, I expect that it will be possible to sort through the points of debate in future studies. In particular, one gets the strong impression that after Ili had been occupied too much emphasis was placed on the Great Game between Britain and Russia in the literature written from the late 19th century through the first half of the 20th. However, this article represents a first attempt to work toward a different angle of analysis, in short, to investigate it from a more local perspective.

Russia, the occupier of Ili, wound up ruling the region for 10 years. One of its objectives certainly came from the fact that it had trade with the Qing that went through Ili. Russia sought to stabilize the region as a relay point for goods, bringing about improvements in productivity for local society and a degree of calm as a result. After the Treaty of Saint Petersburg^{cv} was concluded, Russo-Qing trade flourished still more.^{cvi}

Furthermore, one important development that occurred after Ili's reversion was the movement of the Taranchis trying to escape Qing territory by heading toward the Russian lands [Rumiantsev 2000: 224]. Two years after the treaty was concluded, the Russian Empire had laid-down a policy of non-interference with regards to movement from Qing to Russian territory [Fedorov 1903: 67-68]. The population of Taranchis in Ili declined as a consequence; this is believed to have affected the region's productive capacity as well, but this is another issue I would like to address in near future. It also goes without saying that movements of this sort were linked to the creation of new ethnicities in the Russian Empire such as the Taranchis (and later the Uyghur) and the Tungans.^{cvii}

The *Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan* (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) who entered Xinjiang after the People's Republic of China was created were truly a modern-day colonial militia; comparing their efforts with the means by which colonization took place in the Qing period

and sorting out their place in history will also be needed. I hope to address these issues, too, in the future while making use of the materials, especially those found in the archival documents of TsGA RK.

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NOTES

ⁱ Hino was a major in the Army General Staff Office at the time of his visit to Xinjiang. There are indications that he was influenced by the observations of HAYASHIIDE Kenjirō and HATANO Yōsaku, who visited to Ili before he did [Fujita 2000: 89]; I hope compare his work with the

- records they left behind at some future date.
- ⁱⁱ Considerable research has been done already regarding treaty negotiations over reversion of the Ili region as well as regarding CENG Jize, who played an important role at the time for the Qing.
 - ⁱⁱⁱ Regarding agricultural development in Xinjiang, including Ili, during the Qing period, please see [Wang 1990] and [Hua 1998]. However, note should be made of the fact that they make little mention of the period of Russian rule.
 - ^{iv} For an overview of the TS, please see [Obiya 2008].
 - ^v The total area of the Ili district today measures 56,339 km². The “Ili region” during the era of Russian rule covered 1,302 square Russian miles (71,317 km²) [Fedorov 1903: 67].
 - ^{vi} The people originally from Ili and those who fled from the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz constituted the right column, while the people from Rehe comprised the left [Zongtong Yili Shixuan: 203-204].
 - ^{vii} There were military colonies (*Bingtun* 兵屯), who were made up of Green Standard soldiers, and civilian colonies (*hutun*), which included the *hutun* discussed below as well as merchants [Yijiang Jizai: 104-105].
 - ^{viii} My description is based on the maps produced by Lt. Col. Fedorov, who in 1902 was attached to the General Staff of the Russian Army’s Governor-Generalship of Turkistan [Fedorov 1903: maps appendix].
 - ^{ix} Radloff reports that they referred to themselves as *Järlik* (“local people,” *Einheimische*) [Radloff 1893: 331]. Radloff, a Russian linguist, went to Ili via West Siberia to carry out research from 1862-63. Dates from Russian-language archival materials hereafter will be rendered as written in accordance with the Old-Style (hereafter, O.S.) Julian calendar then used in Russia. Add 12 days to 19th century dates and 13 to 20th century dates to find the date in the New-Style (N.S.) Gregorian calendar.
 - ^x [Wang 1990: 209]. For details regarding the number of Taranchis who were moved, see [Wu 1993].
 - ^{xi} [Saguchi 1986: 273, 284]. [Wang 1990: 226] obtains the same figure, though by means of a different calculation method. Note: *1shi* (=10*dou*) is approximately 100 liters. Analyses of the perceptions the Taranchis themselves had regarding Qing rule include that of [Hamada 1983: 391-397].
 - ^{xii} [Saguchi 1986: 275]. Saguchi relies for the most part on [Radloff 1886], but a similar account also appears in [Radloff 1893: 331].
 - ^{xiii} There are reports from the Russian period on the existence of *waqf* lands in Ili [Kaul’bars 1874: 147] and the number of mullahs in each Taranchis settlement [Pantusov 1876a: 198].
 - ^{xiv} The seven cities in Ili were Suiding, Xichun (Chengpanzi), Huining (Bayantai), Taleqi, Zhande (Qingshuihe), Guangren (Lucaogou), and Gongchen (Huerguosi). (Traditional place names are presented in parentheses.) See also [Guan 2000: 112].
 - ^{xv} For details of Russo-Qing trade relations, see Noda 2009.
 - ^{xvi} Dated September 20, 1860, and addressed to caravan leader Dzhenbai of the Adban clan (*vo-lost’*) [TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 372, l. 14].

- ^{xvii} On the 16th day of the 7th month, *The Memorials of Yingxiu and others* [*Qingdai zhong'e*: 169-170]. See also [Nomiya 1977: 227].
- ^{xviii} “Russo-Qing trade with Xinjiang by way of East Kazakhstan had clearly declined in connection with the uprising,” to quote Kasymbaev [Kasymbaev 1996: 87].
- ^{xix} Regarding the disappearance in caravan traffic after 1865, see [Kaul’bars 1876: 142].
- ^{xx} See [Rumianstev 2000: 111] and [Fedorov 1903: 221] regarding the characteristics of and navigation on the Ili River. Ferry traffic on the Ili River following the Qing suppression is said to have been seen starting in the third month and ending in the ninth [*Yijiang Huilan*: 75]. [Qi 1998] presents a history of transportation on the Ili River from the Qing period to the 1960s.
- ^{xxi} The *Ili memorials (Yili zouzhe)* includes documents dated Xianfeng 7, intercalary 5.6 (June 15, 1857 O.S., June 27 N.S.) sent from the Russian consul in Ili to the Office of the Military Governor of Ili [Nomiya 1977: 208]. The Russian consul is shown in them to regard areas east of Turgen village (recorded as “*Selenie*” in Russian translation) as Qing territory.
- ^{xxii} Dated Xianfeng 7.6.18 (1857) [RGVIA: f. 1449 (Independent Siberian Corps, 1825-64), d. 63, ll. 82-83 ob.] (A copy may also be found in the *Ili zouzhe* [Nomiya 1977: 215-216]). The Lifan Yuan (Court of Colonial Affairs) sent its note of rejection to the Russian Senate on Xianfeng 7.7.25 (O.S. September 1, 1857) [*Qingdai zhong'e*: 367-368]
- ^{xxiii} Kuznetsov, a merchant from the Omsk No. 2 guild, claimed in his request (March 1856) that sailing a steamship to Lake Balkhash and the Ili River would be benefit Russian trade [GAOMO, f. 3, op. 3, d. 3485, l. 47].
- ^{xxiv} [Fisher 1872] is the record of that expedition.
- ^{xxv} [Hino 1973 vol. 2: 28-29]. Information regarding the water’s depth appears to be based on the account of NISHI Tokujirō, believed to be the first Japanese to visit Ili (*Chūōajia kiji* [Travels in Central Asia], vol. 1, 1886, p. 63).
- ^{xxvi} Russian language archival materials use the spelling “Dungan.”
- ^{xxvii} [Wu 1991] and [Kim 2004] are particularly important. The revolt and the issue of the Kashgar regime (that is to say, that of Yaqub-bek) that followed caught the attention of the European and American publics, and these matters have been discussed in countless works. Among the more important of the earliest literature are [Terent’ev 1875], [Schuyler 1877], and [Boulger 1878]. These were followed by works whose arguments hinged on the Anglo-Russian conflict, including [Frechtling 1939] and Lattimore [1951]. From China there are [Wu 1991] and [Li 1995]. [Kim 2004] presents research that adopts a stance closer to that of the local society, while [Gurevich 1982] and [Moiseev 2003] are notable for coming from the context of Russo-Qing relations.
- ^{xxviii} [Hino 1973 vol. 1: 180] writes, “At the time of the Tongzhi Hui uprising, Manchurians and Solons fought with all their might and for the most part died in battle, while Sibe colluded with the Muslim rebels and barely escaped danger.”
- ^{xxix} Even Fedorov [1903: 49] also writes that the halt of trade spoiled Russia’s long years of successful diplomatic negotiations.
- ^{xxx} As Rongquan (榮全)—who was both a representative of the military governor of Ili and the

councilor of Uliyastai—was writing his letter dated Tongzhi 6 8.18 addressed to the Russian military general of Semipalatinsk (總管斜米等處), the West Siberia Governor-general informed Russian Ambassador Vlangali, “Since the outbreak of the rebellion, both warriors and commoners along China’s western border have been abandoning their fields and homes and streaming one after another into Russian territory.” He informed him that 13,861 Mongols, Solons, and Sibe were living Russian territory at Kopal and Alatau [TsGA RK: f. 44, op. 1, d. 3, l. 41]. A document dated April 2, 1868, shows that 2,528 Han Chinese (*Kitai*), 910 Solons and Sibe, 4 Manchurians, and 5,497 Oyrads (*Kalymyk*) were counted in Vernyi [TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 585, l. 141].

^{xxx}ⁱ See [Uyama 2006: 32] regarding prosyletization of Russian Orthodoxy to this population.

^{xxx}ⁱⁱ The Turgen River is a tributary of the Usek. The treaty states: “The border will follow the Turgen’ River, and then pass among the *karun* at Boro-khotszir, Kuitun, Tsitsikhan, and Khorgos until it arrives at the *karun* at Ili-bilai-tsikin” [Skachkov; Miasnikov 1958: 47].

^{xxx}ⁱⁱⁱ For details on this lineage see [Semenov 1910: note 45].

^{xxx}^{iv} According to [Rumiantsekh 2000: 97], Tazabek (or *Tazybek*) was the chief of a branch of the *Alban* (alternately, *Adban*) clan. See also [Moiseev 2003: 86]. A report from the assistant director general of the Alatau district to the director general dated March 3, 1867, details the cooperation Tazabek gave to Russian officials [TsGA RK: f. 3, op. 1, d. 275, l. 43ob.].

^{xxx}^v “Tazabek, chieftain of the Kazakh Alban clan originally affiliated with China, opposed Russian colonial rule in the area newly occupied by the Russians. He rose up an army, but unfortunately they failed. The approximately 1,000 nomads led by Tazabek fled to China and made their way to Ili by way of Chunji” [*Xinjiang jianshi*: 145].

^{xxx}^{vi} See [Noda 2008a]. According to [Aristov 2003b: 295], the Kazakh population in areas surrounding Ili stood at 5,500 households with 22,340 people. The Kyzai clan roamed the areas around Lake Sayram and the Barluq mountains, while the Suwan clan roamed the right and left banks of the Ili. According to [Rumiantsev 2000: 97-98], after 1864 (according to regulations introduced in 1867, Russian governance was extended to cover the Kazakhs in Semirech’e Oblast’ as well) the Alban and Suwan clans shifted to the side of the Sultanate in Ili and launched attacks on Russian sentry posts.

^{xxx}^{vii} In 1868, he would be imprisoned for the crime of plotting to attempt to cross the border to move to Qing territory [Khafizova 2002: 12]. According to a report of October 7, 1869, sent to the military governor of Semirech’e by the leader of Altyn-emel’ volost’, Tezek was extremely unhappy that he had not become the head of the township with which he had been affiliated already for quite some time [TsGA RK: f. 44, op. 1, d. 29185, l. 5].

^{xxx}^{viii} He was in command of the Taranchis army in Ketmen at the time of the Russian Army’s invasion [Kolpakovskii 1872: 225].

^{xxx}^{ix} [Paine 1996: 119]. There is also a letter (August 1869) the Tungans in Urumqi sent to the Russian authorities asking to be protected from Yaqub-bek’s attacks [Moiseev 2006: 187-188].

^x^l A.V. Kaul’bars (born 1844) worked for the army and in 1872 led the mission to Kashgaria.

^x^{li} See, for example, [Paine 1996: 121]. Also, according to [Rostovsky 1942: 159], the Russian For-

eign Ministry was perplexed by the report from Kaufman.

^{xlii} For a copy of the meeting minutes, see [Semenov 1910: XL]. [Moiseev 2006: 74] cites documents in the hands of the RGVIA that contain the same material. Contrary to this document, Matsuzato [2008: 315-316] argued that Kaufman's occupation of Ili district without the permission of the central government revealed the shortcoming of the Governor-generalship system, which caused the extreme separations of power. Thus, this issue requires further investigation.

^{xliii} According to [Aristov 2003b: 290], this was in August 1870.

^{xliv} On the basic structure of the regime, see [Shinmen 1987].

^{xlv} Poltoratsky, the military governor of Semipalatinsk in 1867, traveled to Naryn to deliver a letter to Yaqub-bek [Moiseev 2006: 39]. Shadi-Mirza was the return envoy from Kashgar, who traveled with a caravan on its return to Vernyi in August 1868 [Moiseev 2006: 47]. Also, Reintal', who was attached with the Russian Army, went from Tashkent in October to visit Yaqub-bek [Boulger 1878: 184]. I note that at this point Russia did not recognize Yaqub-bek's authority [Rawlinson 1875: 330].

^{xlvi} *Affairs in Central Asia, Central Asia No. 2* (1873), Correspondence respecting Central Asia, no. 15, November 2, 1869 (printed in London, 1873), sent from Ambassador Buchanan in Petersburg to the Earl of Clarendon. The text of the letter from Forsyth to Buchanan enclosed to this correspondence reads as follows. "If Yakoub Bey proved a good neighbour, the Russians would be happy to trade with him, and possibly hereafter, if he entirely established his independence, they might be induced to enter into negotiations with him."

^{xlvii} Report No. 169 of March 3, 1867 sent by the assistant director general of the Alatau district to his director general reads as follows: "I have received the following information regarding the situation in East Turkistan. *Yaqub-bek* [emphasis added], the ruler of Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, had thus far been subordinate to however many maharajah in Kashmir. However, now that the British are captivated with Kashmir and this ruler sees the Qing army drawing nearer to quell the uprising, he has entered relations with the British and it appears as though he has aligned his [towns of] Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan and their territories with the British. I have also been told that he sent seven men from his lands to Yaqub-akhun, chief of the Tungans in Ili, to say he has made Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, and Turfan subject to the British and ask whether or not the chief would join them as well. From what we hear, the Ili Tungans sent their agreement to this proposal and for that reason Yaqub-bek has pledged to send reinforcements after the spring." [TsGA RK: f.3, op.1, d.275, l.43]

^{xlviii} Also known as *Mustau*. Situated to the southwest of the Ili region, it is the only pass that runs south to Aksu.

^{xlix} According to [Lattimore 1951: 46], initially there were no plans either in Britain or the Governor-General of India to get deeply involved in Xinjiang affairs.

¹ The Soviet-era account that Sakamoto [1967: 167] cites (*Е. М. Жуков, Международные отношения на Дальнем Востоке (1840-1949)*, Москва: Государственное издательство политической литературы, 1956) reads as follows: "The purpose of the Russia's occupation of Ili

was to prevent the unrest from spreading into Russian territory in Central Asia, to restore profitable commercial relations with Xinjiang, and so that Ili would not be occupied by *Yaqub-bek, who Britain was attempting to turn into a tool for their aggressive plans* [emphasis added].”

- ^{li} Paine [1996: 120] links Russia’s intentions with opposition to the territorial ambitions of the Taranchis sultan, a claim whose validity will require further investigation.
- ^{lii} “I will not get into the political aspects of the new treaty that resulted in the reversion of the Ili region to China. However, we should note that while Russia put the Ili region under its protection in 1871, it did not refuse to return it to China. But political issues aside, this does not mean we should not pay special attention to the terms of the new treaty that relate to our overland trade in northwestern China” [Skachkov 1881: 367].
- ^{liii} Correspondence of Tongzhi 12.1.25 from the Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen to Russian Ambassador Vlangali [QWD: 01-20-028-03-004] (俄商赴科哈伊犁等處貿易案). There is reference to Russian merchants asking to go to Barqul to conduct trade. The Russian merchant Kuznetsov was headed for Urumqi to conduct a market survey in 1871 (in fact he got no farther than Manas) [Fedorov 1903: 58].
- ^{liv} Before the occupation, the Russian army issued a proclamation that blamed the sultan. Russia was so worried about his influence over the local people as to confine him leniently in Vernyi, the report of Semirech’e military governor to Turkistan Governor-General, dated May 8, 1872 [TsGA RK: f.21, op.1, d.20, l.19].
- ^{lv} See [Boulger 1878: 277-303].
- ^{lvi} The average flow measures 374 m³/second, and the annual flow including tributaries reaches 14.8 billion m³ [*Xinjiang Yili kaifa*: 13].
- ^{lvii} The population reached 34,300 during the Jiaqing era [Hua 1998: 168].
- ^{lviii} [Radloff 1893: 331]. The translation in [Saguchi 1986: 280 note 21] that analyzes this same point is incorrect. These taxes amount to more than 250 rubles per household.
- ^{lix} [Radloff 1886: 31]. See also [Saguchi 1986: 266] for a summary.
- ^{lx} Regarding Sandaohe, also known as Ak-su, see [Fedorov 1903: 194].
- ^{lxi} [Wang 1990: 215] estimates it at 180,000 *mu* (1 *mu* is approximately 600 m²).
- ^{lxii} The memorial of Zhalafentai, dated Xianfeng 7, intercalary 5.11 (this is a slightly revised version of the translation that appears in [Kato 1986: 7]).
- ^{lxiii} Including such works as *Tārīkh-i shahrūkhī* and *Tārīkh-i amnīya*.
- ^{lxiv} The word originally meant “charity” or “alms,” but here it was used perhaps more generally to refer to taxes.
- ^{lxv} Records show that the tribute collected in Daoguang 29 (1849) stood at 20 horses, and in Daoguang 30 at 17 [*Qingdai zhong’e*: 11].
- ^{lxvi} This includes those newly established at some point during the *Jiaqing* (嘉慶) period. See also [Saguchi 1986: 262]. In addition, *Wulankutule* (烏蘭庫圖勒), *Wuliyasutu* (烏里雅蘇圖), and *Chunji* (春稽) were newly established in Jiaqing 9 (1804).
- ^{lxvii} *Sotnia* (lit., “one-hundred doors” or “one-hundred households”) is a name that was given solely

as a unit for administrative purposes and absolutely does not refer to an actual number.

^{lxxviii} [Pantusov 1876a: 202]. The units for barley and wheat are glossed as “*Kho* or *Tagara*.”

^{lxxix} According to Fedorov, 1 *kho* = 4 *mo* (mu), and 1 *mo* = 132 square *sazhen* [approx. 602 m²] and 42.4 square *vershok*.

^{lxxx} Similarly, according to Fedorov, the Han Chinese took 16 *kho* (8 *kho* of wheat and 8 *kho* of common millet) from each clan, but the Sibe wanted an award and placed burdens on residents to bribe the government; for that reason the tax burden stood at 30-32 *kho*. In this instance, a *kho* appears equivalent to 1 *shi*.

^{lxxxi} Since one *chetvert'* was an area measuring 5,460 m², 1 *khu* equaled 2,730 m². This is close to the 4*1 *mo* (that is, 4*602 m²) indicated by Fedorov.

^{lxxxii} 1 *dzhin* = 596.82 g. Since 100 *dzhin* was equivalent to 1 Taranchis *kho*, 1 *kho* = 60 kg.

^{lxxxiii} In accordance with the old system, 1 *tagar* = 1 *shi*. Radloff defines 1 *tagara* as roughly the same as 3 *cho* (in *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialekte*). The values they represent are said to differ in the northern and southern districts of Xinjiang [Saguchi 1986: 278, 280].

^{lxxxiv} For reference, in the case of rye 1 *chetvert'* (approx. 2 *shi*) can be converted to 8 *pood* (approx. 130 kg). While the figure differs depending on the type of grain, in general we may consider 1 *shi* to amount to around 60 kg.

^{lxxxv} The two districts, which were divided by the Ili River, were under the jurisdiction of district (*Uchastok*) directors. The Northern District was administered from Ghulja, and the Southern from Kainak village [Fedorov 1903: 55].

^{lxxxvi} Tongzhi 11.5 *gengxu*, the memorial of Rongquan and others [Chouban *yiwu shimo*: vol.86, 38].

^{lxxxvii} [Yijiang *Huilan*: 40-41]. Regarding the population in 1871, records show that there were “approximately 600 Manchu soldiers, 1,400 Green Standard soldiers, 16,996 Sibe, 9,203 Chahar Mongols in both columns, and 7,254 Oyrads” (Tongzhi 10.10 *guiwei*) [Chouban *yiwu shimo*: vol. 84, 10]. The statistics concerning the population of the occupation time are also kept in TsGA RK, according to which, in 1871, the entire population was 99,876 [TsGA RK: f. 21, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 116-117ob.].

^{lxxxviii} The units that comprised the Eight Banners have also been called *zuoling*. The Sibe force was composed of eight *niru*.

^{lxxxix} One *kent* was made up of around 100 households. Each *kent* was generally given the name of one of its elders (*strashina*).

^{lxxx} Each *aul* was likewise made up of around 100 households.

^{lxxxxi} [Bartol'd 1964: 334] points out that Tungans introduced rice cultivation to Semirech'e.

^{lxxxii} Measured in *chetvert'*. This Russian unit for grain volume is equivalent to 209.21 liters.

^{lxxxiii} Turning to the Ili region in modern times, the area under cultivation in 1949 stood at 182,900 hectares and 1998 at 685,900 hectares, with the main crops under cultivation being winter and spring wheat (from Ukraine) [Zizhizhou *zhi*: 467]. Total production volume in 1949 for the 139,100 hectare area under cultivation for wheat amounted to 110,000 tons, or 54 tons per *mu*. In

1998, these figures stood at 1.1 million tons against 260,400 hectares under cultivation, or 283 tons per *mu* [ibid.: 473].

^{lxxxiv} On tax collection, see also [Fedorov 1903: 58].

^{lxxxv} The 1877 price list for the South District indicates that 1 *ch.* of wheat was worth 2 rubles, 40 kopecks, while the same amount of barley traded for 1 ruble, 65 kopecks [Pantusov 1881: 186-187]. In the price list for 1876, wheat earned at most 1 ruble, 26 kopecks in the South District and 2 rubles, 20 kopecks in the North. Barley stood at around 1 ruble, 40 kopecks [Pantusov 1881: 124-125].

^{lxxxvi} [Kaul'bars 1874: 143]. Regarding abundant fruit production, see [Hino 1973 vol. 2: 135].

^{lxxxvii} Fedorov, too, spoke of “going against the desires of its residents and our interests in returning Ghulja” [Fedorov 1903: 69].

^{lxxxviii} The period of Russian rule is viewed in an extremely negative light in [Wu 1993: 86-87], though it must be said that his account is lacking in fairness.

^{lxxxix} Kaul'bars carried a comprehensive analysis at the time that touched on such matters as the characteristics of the Ili River and environmental conditions [Kaul'bars 1874].

^{xc} Tongzhi 10.7.17 (1870), the memorial of the First Prince *Gong* [恭親王] and others [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 82, 6].

^{xcⁱ} The RGVIA document cited by Gurevich opines: “What is important to us is for neighboring governments [i.e., the Qing] to grant us material and moral privileges that will make the free development of our trade possible” [Gurevich 1982: 441].

^{xcⁱⁱ} The report to the emperor dated 7.20 (O.S. August 23) may be found in [NDD: 108911]. This reached the central authorities on Tongzhi 10.8.10 (O.S. September 12, 1870) [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 83: 15].

^{xcⁱⁱⁱ} No. 242, from Buchanan to the Earl of Granville, September 5, 1871 [FO: 881/2223]. I was able to use FO thanks to the kindness of KATŌ Yūzō (Research Institute for Humanity and Nature).

^{xc^{iv}} Document attached to No. 243 (September 5), Extract from the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* [FO: 539/9/207].

^{xc^v} Tongzhi 10 *wuyin*, the memorial of Rongquan [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 84: 39].

^{xc^{vi}} Tongzhi 11.2 *renxu* [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 85: 34].

^{xc^{vii}} Tongzhi 11.4 *wuwu*, the report by Eight Banners Chief Jing Lian in Urumqi *dutong* [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 86: 1].

^{xc^{viii}} Tongzhi 11.6 *xinsi*, the memorial of the first Prince Gong and others [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 87: 7].

^{xc^{ix}} [Voskresenskii 1995: 84]. This is consistent with the conditions that Vlangali had earlier passed on to the Zongli Yamen regarding the Qing proposal for negotiations to be conducted on site ([1] that Rongquan prepared a well-armed military force and [2] that crimes from the time of the *Hui-min* Revolt be pardoned) [Gurevich 1982: 444].

^c Correspondence from Boguslavsky to the Governor-general of Turkistan, May 21, 1872 [Semenov 1910: XLVIII].

- ^{ci} Tongzhi 11.11 *dinghai*, the report of Rongquan [*Chouban yiwu shimo*: vol. 88, 20-21].
- ^{cii} The area between Boro-khotszir and Khorgos newly decided to be Russian territory measured 220.07 square Russian miles (12,051 km²). The 1082.29 square Russian miles that reverted to the Qing was equivalent to 59,266 km².
- ^{ciii} For example, the article by V. Vasil'ev that appeared in “Голос” (1878, issue 25) [TS, t. 195].
- ^{civ} See Следует ли уступить Китаю Кульджу? // Новое Время, 1878, no. 720., by Вл-. [TS, t. 196, c. 51-59].
- ^{cv} There was a “Revised Overland Trade Charter” as a supplement to the treaty.
- ^{cvi} [Kasymbaev 1996: 107]. Regarding economic relations between Russia and Xinjiang after the treaty was concluded, including in the field of finance, see [Galiev 2003] and [Mi 2005] (note that the two works need to be compared to one another since each is based on only one set of archival materials—Russian or Qing, respectively).
- ^{cvii} According to statistics from 1884, the number of Taranchis in Vernyi Province and the Dzhar-kent district stood at 45,373, while there were 9,136 Dungans in the two aforementioned areas as well as Toqmaq and Issik-kul provinces (note that the figure for Dungans includes 4,454 people migrants from Kashgar) [Galuzo 1961: 88-89].